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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT			
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK			
3	Case No. 09-50026(REG)			
4	x			
5	In the Matter of:			
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7	GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,			
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9	Debtors.			
10				
11	x			
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13	U.S. Bankruptcy Court			
14	One Bowling Green			
15	New York, New York			
16				
17	February 28, 2012			
18	9:56 AM			
19				
20	BEFORE:			
21	HON ROBERT E. GERBER			
22	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE			
23				
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25				

Page 2 1 Hearing re: Motion of Wilmington Trust Company, (I) as GUC 2 Trust Administrator, to (A) Liquidate New GM Securities for the Purpose of Funding Fees, Costs and Expenses of the GUC 3 Trust and the Avoidance Action Trust, and (B) Transfer New 4 5 GM Securities to the Avoidance Action Trust for the Purpose 6 of Funding Future Tax Liabilities, and (II) as Avoidance 7 Action Trust Administrator, the Approve an Amendment to the 8 Avoidance Action Trust Agreement - Evidentiary Hearing 9 10 Hearing re: Status Conference re: Nova Scotia Issues 11 12 Hearing re: Motion of Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 107(B) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 13 14 9018 For An Order Authorizing Filing of Complaint Under Seal 15 - Discovery Conference 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Transcribed by: Sherri L. Breach and Dawn South

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Page 6 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE CLERK: All rise. 3 THE COURT: Good morning, have seats, please. 4 Have seats everybody. 5 I see some of you have decided to take the front 6 counsel table before hearing how I want to handle things 7 today. We're going to deal with them in an order 8 different than those that I have on the calendar and on the 9 10 agenda. I want to hear the Nova Scotia matters first. Let's have everybody come up for that purpose, please. 11 12 (Pause) 13 THE COURT: After you get organized I want to get appearances and then I want you to sit down. 14 15 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, Eric Fisher and Katie 16 Cooperman from Dickstein Shapiro for the GUC Trust. 17 THE COURT: Okay. That's -- you're Mr. Fisher and 18 your colleague is Ms. Cooperman? 19 MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ZIRINSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. Bruce 21 22 Zirinsky and Kevin Finger of Greenberg Traurig for the 23 noteholders. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. STEINBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Arthur

Page 7 1 Steinberg and Scott Davidson from King & Spalding on behalf 2 of New General Motors. 3 THE COURT: All right. Folks --MR. DUBLIN: One second, Your Honor. I'm sorry. 4 5 Phil Dublin and Sean O'Donnell --6 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Dublin. 7 MR. DUBLIN: Phil Dublin and Sean O'Donnell from 8 Akin Gump for Green Hunt Wedlake. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. O'DONNELL: Good morning, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Dublin, your colleague's name? 12 MR. DUBLIN: Sean O'Donnell. 13 THE COURT: O'Donnell. Okay. All right. Folks, I got the Dickstein Shapiro 14 15 reply on the public filing and I want you all preliminarily 16 to advise me as to the extent to which I, therefore, have 17 any remaining issues vis-à-vis public filing on the one hand 18 or a filing in a redacted form on the other, and with a particular focus on paragraph 44 of the proposed complaint. 19 20 The main thing I want to then spend time on is on 21 the disputed documents or the documents where I have 22 allegations which may or may not be disputed that the 23 creditors' committee or the -- I guess it's modern name is 24 the GUC Trust -- relied on those documents in its proposed 25 complaint.

I'll want both sides to address, in particular, the degree of specificity by which the GUC Trust advised the defendants' side of its intention to use the documents in question and to clarify on a document by document basis, if need be, the extent of any delay or alleged delay between the time that the defendants' side was notified of the intent to rely upon them and the time the defendants' side made its views known.

I am going to assume, subject to both sides rights to be heard, but principally the GUC Trust, that the inadvertent disclosure of those documents in the first instance, even if accompanied by some fault, would not by itself give rise to a waiver, so that the contention is that if there was a waiver it was not by reason of the delivery of the documents, but rather a delay or alleged delay in demanding their return and destruction.

With that said, maybe I should hear first from you, Mr. Fisher. Main lectern, please.

MR. FISHER: Good morning, Your Honor.

With respect to the first issue which is the status of the motion to seal, I think that a fair summary of where we are is that all parties, with the exception of Aurelius, which I'll deal with in just a moment, consent to the public filing of the complaint. And my understanding is that Aurelius' object -- Aurelius' objection to the public

Page 9 filing is not based on any confidentiality concerns, but is 1 2 instead based on the production of privilege information 3 dispute that Your Honor referred to. So under -- under the protective order and with 4 5 regard to confidentiality issues I don't think anyone is 6 objecting at this point to the public filing of the 7 complaint. And once Your Honor resolves the pending discovery dispute about the production of privileged 8 information, I think from there flows the decision as to 9 10 whether the complaint can be filed publicly or needs to be 11 revised or redacted in some way, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Mr. Fisher, would it make sense if before you continue with the remainder of the 13 14 issues you yield to Mr. Zirinsky or whoever it is to brief 15 me on the Aurelius position and his views as to what I 16 should do about it? 17 MR. FISHER: I'd be happy to do that, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ZIRINSKY: Your Honor, I'll defer to 19 20 Mr. Finger. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. FINGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Kevin 23 Finger, Greenberg Traurig, on behalf of Aurelius Capital Management and its managed entities. 24 25 Your Honor, with respect to the -- to the

complaint and the GUC Trust motion to file it under seal, the objection that Aurelius has is that one paragraph, paragraph 144, appears to -- to quote one of the four documents that has been clawed back on the grounds of that it's protected from disclosure on the attorney/client privilege. It is unclear whether any of the other three documents are cited. The complaint does not refer to any specific documents other than -- than publicly filed documents like SEC filings.

So from our reading of the complaint it's just paragraph 144 that appears to quote one of the documents that has been clawed back, and that is the basis of the objection with respect to filing the complaint.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Finger, there is, of course, the underlying issue. But if your opponent is inappropriately relying on a document, your opponent is inappropriately relying on the document to influence me or some higher court. What difference does it make if the rest of the world sees that or not since I'm going to see it anyway?

MR. FINGER: It is -- the difference is that it's a privileged document that is protected from disclosure and that means protected from -- from everybody from disclosure. In that sense that's --

THE COURT: What is the harm that you are trying

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to obviate?

MR. FINGER: The harm is the disclosure of

privileged communications.

THE COURT: Well, putting aside the fact that your opponent contends that it's not privileged, it's not privileged at all because it allegedly conveys information obtained from third parties and your opponents contention that it is subject to a waiver, would you articulate for me, if you can, the incremental prejudice to you resulting from the remainder of the world seeing it?

MR. FINGER: It -- it's -- we disagree with Mr. Fisher's characterization that it's not privileged.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. FINGER: And I could go into that in more depth at the Court's pleasure.

THE COURT: But assume for the sake of answering my question, which I would like to get the answer to, that you're right.

MR. FINGER: Your Honor, it's the -- it's the fundamental protections that are provided against the disclosure of privileged documents. It's an attorney/client communication that's between -- clearly between lawyers at Greenberg Traurig and clients at Aurelius, and that client is entitled to a privilege -- to the privilege and entitled to protect otherwise responsive documents from disclosure on

the grounds of privilege, and that's the prejudice.

THE COURT: Mr. Finger, did you understand my last question when I asked about the incremental prejudice that results as a consequence of the disclosure to the remainder of the public?

MR. FINGER: I guess I don't understand, Your
Honor, the increment -- what you mean by incremental
prejudice, but I've -- I've tried to articulate the
prejudice to Aurelius and protecting its privilege.

THE COURT: Do you have anything further to say?

MR. FINGER: Just, Your Honor, that it's -- it's a mistake that was made by Greenberg Traurig, not by the client, and the client undertook all -- all diligence to protect that privilege in terms of meeting ahead of time and reviewing all the documents not once, but twice. So from the client's perspective who enjoys that privilege, that client shouldn't be prejudiced for Greenberg Traurig's error in this case which led to the inadvertent production.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. FINGER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. If the document is not privileged either because it was never privileged or the portion upon which there was reliance by the GUC Trust is not privileged, or if there was a waiver, the issue goes away in any event. If it remains privileged it may well be

that the publication of the entire document and of the entire complaint is nevertheless appropriate, but I'll defer decision on that until I've heard the remainder of the arguments on the privileged nature of what is at least seemingly the single document referred to in paragraph 44 and the others in question.

Mr. Fisher, come on up again, please, and address that with particular reference to the questions that I asked at the outset.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, first, one thing I wanted to make clear is that when we prepared the complaint and when we submitted the complaint to Your Honor in connection with our motion to file the complaint under seal all of that was done before any documents were clawed back, so I don't think anyone is claiming that it was improper for us to consult these documents in preparing the complaint. We hadn't even received a claw back request yet at that point in time.

And to speak directly to Your Honor's questions about waiver and the privilege that attaches to these particular four documents, I think the chronology which I can sketch out very briefly is critical to our waiver position.

In essence, we sent the first version of our complaint to all parties who had produced confidential

information on December 19th, and we said, here's the complaint that we plan to file. We'd like your consent to file it publicly consistent with the protective order. And the response to --

THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Fisher. At that time did the draft complaint, paragraph 44, have the same or different content than it has now?

MR. FISHER: So, Your Honor, it's paragraph 144.

THE COURT: Oh, 144. Excuse me.

MR. FISHER: And in substance I think in the same words that allegation was in that first version of the complaint. It was in a different paragraph number, but the allegation was there and the quoted language from the document at issue was also in that initial complaint.

THE COURT: Continue.

MR. FISHER: The response that we got back the next day was, that's not good enough. You can't just give us the complaint and ask us to consent to public filing.

We'd like to know every document that was confidential that you relied on in preparing this complaint. We didn't think we were required to, but to move things along we provided the -- all the parties, including the noteholders -- with a complete list of every document that we relied on in preparing the complaint.

THE COURT: In what form? By numeric reference

like Bates numbers alone or a combination of Bates number plus a substantive description of the document associated with the Bates number?

MR. FISHER: It was just --

THE COURT: And by way of example, one of the bones of contention between your constituency and JP Morgan Chase in the underlying term litigation is that describing a document by number as contrasted by a textual description is, at least in the view of some, not as helpful.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, we provided a list of
Bates numbers. There was no substantive description and
that's because we responded the next day with our list and
we didn't -- we didn't want to waste any time.

In response to -- in connection with providing that list of documents we asked all parties to please review it and, if possible, let us know by the end of the week whether they consented to the public filing of the complaint. The response that we received was, that's not enough time. The holidays are upon us. We're going to need a lot more time to carefully review this, and in fact there was an email that we attached to our letter to Your Honor in which Greenberg Traurig said, you're asking us to waive confidentiality under the protective order. We need an opportunity to -- to look at each and every document carefully, and there was a letter from Mr. Zirinsky to -- to

a similar effect.

THE COURT: Is the confidentiality that was the subject of that discussion confidentiality in the commercial sense by which people in case after case after case before me produce documents under confidentiality stips and they say that they want everything under seal, or are we talking in the context of confidentiality within the meaning of the attorney/client privilege or both?

MR. FISHER: I think in -- in context that initial communication from Greenberg Traurig was talking about confidentiality in the commercial sense. In other words, what Greenberg was saying was, before we can allow you to make public allegations that are based on these documents that we've designated as confidential in the commercial sense we need to review them carefully. And they -- they told us that they needed at least until January 5th to get that done. So we said, okay. We can wait until January 5th.

On January 5th we received a letter from Greenberg Traurig on behalf of all the noteholders whose confidential information was implicated by the complaint saying, you know, subject to all of our rights to move to dismiss and -- and, you know, even though we think your complaint is baseless we consent to the public filing of the complaint.

So Greenberg was not the issue at the time. In

fact, it was concerns that -- that -- that new GM and that the GM Nova Scotia finance trustee had about confidentiality that required us to file the motion -- the motion to file under seal. It wasn't Greenberg concerns. As of January 5th they had authorized us to file the complaint publicly.

THE COURT: Now at -- as of January 5th to what extent was Aurelius carved out from the consent granted on the remainder?

MR. FISHER: As of January 5th the letter from Greenberg Traurig was on behalf of all noteholders authorizing us to publicly file the complaint that was based on documents that we had specifically identified to them and that they had told us that they had reviewed and had concluded they had no objection to the public filing of the complaint.

THE COURT: Continue, please.

MR. FISHER: On January 17th we submitted the complaint to the Court in connection with our motion to have the complaint filed under seal, and then on January 19th, two days later, for the first time we received a claw back request from Aurelius, and on January 24th we received a follow up claw back request. In total those two letters requested the return of 115 documents that they said had been inadvertently produced and that were privileged.

It took us approximately a week to comply with the protective order and destroy all of the documents that they said were privileged, but we reserved all of our rights, and we're not here today to argue about the 115 documents.

We're -- that's done. They clawed them back under the protective order and we destroy -- and we destroyed them.

What we're arguing about only are four out of those 115 documents, and the reason why we think that those documents are exceptional are specifically because of the chronology that I just laid out, namely these specific documents. And in terms of Aurelius documents, Your Honor, there were ten documents in total produced by Aurelius that we identified as Aurelius documents that we relied on in preparing the complaint.

So Aurelius had ten documents to look at and told us, you can go ahead and publicly file the complaint and didn't say anything about privilege until after we had prepared two versions of the complaint, because by the time we submitted the complaint to Your Honor it had been revised, and -- and filed a motion to have that complaint filed under -- under seal.

So that's why we think those four documents stand out in terms -- and -- and those are the only documents as to which we're making a waiver argument.

So it's -- to come to a question that Your Honor

Page 19 1 asked at the outset, it's not simply an inadvertent 2 production situation. This is a situation where we received 3 authorization to publicly file a complaint after these specific documents were called to Aurelius' counsel's 4 5 attention and the claw back privilege request came only 6 later. 7 THE COURT: And you're relying, in substance, on the passage of time between December 19th, 2011 and 8 9 January 19th, 2012? 10 MR. FISHER: The documents were first produced -first produced by Aurelius September 30th, 2011. But it's 11 12 not even just the passage of time, Your Honor, it's -- it's -- it's the uniqueness of a situation where your adversary 13 tells you, I've looked at these documents you can go ahead 14 15 and file the complaint. And -- and -- and then only 16 later --17 THE COURT: That -- that being --18 MR. FISHER: -- insists a claw back --THE COURT: -- roughly the period between 19 20 January 5 and January 17? 21 MR. FISHER: Well, the documents were first 22 identified to them on December 20, so we would say from 23 December 20 until January 19 or maybe it was January 24 when 24 the claw back concerning these particular documents came. 25 I'm not -- I'm not certain whether it was the 19th or the

24th with regard to these -- these four.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. FISHER: In terms of arguments as to whether these four documents are privileged or not, as is often the case in these disputes, we're somewhat hamstrung because we've destroyed the documents, but what we do have left is the allegation in paragraph 144, and so there we can make an argument, I think compellingly, as to why the document that we relied on, and the document that's really the irritant here causing the dispute is not privileged. And that's because the document in question is an email wherein a non-lawyer at Aurelius conveyed to another non-lawyer at Aurelius the substance of a conversation that that first non-lawyer --

MR. FINGER: Excuse me, Your Honor. I have to object because I fear that Mr. Fisher's description is conveying the substance of the email and --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. -- I get the point, but as you well know, Mr. Finger, the subject matter of an allegedly privileged communication is not privileged. Only the substance of it is.

Mr. Fisher, I assume you're aware of that
distinction as well --

MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and you're not going to let the cat

Page 21 1 out of the bag in making your point. 2 MR. FISHER: I will be careful. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. FINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 MR. FISHER: So the first non-lawyer at Aurelius 6 was conveying the substance of a conversation that that non-7 lawyer had with counsel to new GM. There's no -- there's no claim of privilege between that non-lawyer -- Aurelius non-8 lawyer's conversation vis-à-vis new GM. When the non-lawyer 9 10 at Aurelius passed that information along to the other non-11 lawyer at Aurelius he copied two -- two lawyers from 12 Greenberg Traurig, and I think that that's what gives rise 13 to the claim of privilege, and our argument is simply that 14 when a non-lawyer passes along a non-privileged conversation 15 and it's clear from the face of the document, as we recall 16 it, that the primary objective of -- of this communication 17 was not to secure legal advice, but to convey the substance 18 of a non-privileged conversation. We don't think that a claim of privilege 19 20 appropriately attaches to that document, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. 22 Mr. Finger. 23 MR. FINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 The -- this was an inadvertent production caused 25 by an error by Greenberg Traurig after substantial meetings

Page 22 1 with client representative and lawyers, and I can go into 2 further describe the inadvertence if the -- if the Court is interested in that, but it's --3 THE COURT: Well, pause, please, Mr. Finger. 4 5 You're ahead on that issue because I said that I wasn't of a 6 mind, subject to Mr. Fisher's ability to be heard, to say 7 that the production in the first instance amounted to the 8 waiver. Do you still want to address that? 9 MR. FINGER: No, Your Honor. I was going to say 10 I was going to transition to the -- to the December 19th through January 19th time period if that's acceptable to the 11 12 Court. 13 THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. FINGER: The -- counsel did provide a draft 14 15 complaint on January 19th in pursuant to request a --16 THE COURT: You said January 19th. 17 MR. FINGER: I'm sorry. 18 THE COURT: Did you mean December 19th? MR. FINGER: I did, Your Honor, I misspoke. On 19 20 December 19th. On December 20th provided a list of Bates 21 numbers of the 192 Bates ranges, but many of those ranges 22 contained multiple documents, and it's --23 THE COURT: I couldn't hear you on that last 24 point. 25 MR. FINGER: I'm sorry. It's 192 separate Bates

ranges, but within certain of the Bates ranges were multiple documents and that amounted to a stack of paper several inches high.

On -- now as part of that draft complaint there were three defendants named that were once holders of the Nova Scotia notes, but at that point in time and still today do not hold those notes. And on December 21st Greenberg Traurig sent a letter to Mr. Fisher on behalf of three of those clients, Aurelius, Capital Management, Appaloosa and Perry informing them that they were not holders of notes or holders of claims and were not proper defendants in that complaint. And that was the response on behalf of those three noteholders.

On behalf of the other three clients of Greenberg

Traurig that -- that currently held notes and continue to

hold notes, we sent a separate response that informed

Dickstein Shapiro that we would need additional time in

order to consider the issue of confidentiality.

On January -- on January 5th, Mr. Davidson, on behalf of new General Motors, sent an email to Ms. Cooperman and asked about the status of the complaint. Ms. Cooperman responded and said, we have revised the complaint, but we will not show it to you. So we still want to know whether you'll consent to publicly filing it. And with that response we sent a very short response that said, subject to

all of our rights and remedies, including the right to change our mind about whether it should be publicly filed when we actually see the document, we -- we are not going to stand on the terms of the protective order in terms of compelling the complaint to be filed under seal.

We -- we had discussions with our clients about other concerns that may have over -- overridden the confidentiality issues as protected by the protected (sic) order, but that's what we informed them.

That letter was not on behalf of Aurelius,

Appaloosa or Perry, it was -- it was on behalf of the other

ones, although I will say that the letter itself does not

say that specifically.

THE COURT: Which letter are we talking about doesn't say that specifically?

MR. FINGER: The January 5th letter whereby we informed Mr. Fisher that we were not going to invoke our rights under the protective order to cause the revise complaint that we hadn't seen to file it under seal.

On January 17th Mr. Fisher informed us, the noteholders, new GM, et cetera, that it intended to file a motion to file under seal, and later that afternoon or the evening it sent a copy of the revised draft complaint, which is the first time we had seen it on January 17th.

On January 19th is when Aurelius sent the letter

clawing back a certain number of documents, caused Greenberg Traurig to review not only the Aurelius production, but every production on behalf of its noteholder clients to see whether the error that caused the inadvertent production in September had been extended to other client productions.

On January 24th we sent a letter with a complete list of claw back documents, and that's the sequence of events, Your Honor. The -- but that sequence, really, is -- is not govern here because the agreed protective order that's entered by the Court is what governs. In paragraph 3 of that protective order says specifically that the inadvertent production of documents otherwise protected from disclosure does not serve as a waiver of the privilege. That -- that -- and the cases --

THE COURT: All right. Pause, please.

MR. FINGER: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you contending that that would provide absolution for all time or would you still be subject to what is, in substance, a latches contention?

MR. FINGER: Well, Your Honor, I -- the terms of the protective order and the cases that interpret similar provisions of protective orders indicates, or at least suggests that it -- I wouldn't say for all time, that seems extreme -- but that there is no timeliness requirement built That's what the rules and the case law would otherwise

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impose in the absence of a protective order. And what the cases say that interpret the protective order that have been ordered -- that's the Zevally (ph) case, the HDB -- HDB Nordberg (ph) case, and others suggest that that timeliness requirement has been negotiated away and that in a similar provision the inadvertent production of privileged documents does not serve as a waiver and then it provides a procedure for that.

And the remedy that's also provided in that

paragraph 3 is if the receiving party wants to challenge the

designation of privilege they may do so by motion, but that

-- that's how the protective order handles the situation and

that protective order governs this case, and the cases

interpreting it from the Southern District of New York state

clearly that the protective order trumps the case law and

even Federal Rule of Evidence 502.

So in this case the -- there is no timeliness requirement. But even if there was a timeliness requirement, Your Honor, that's been met here in the sense that it -- that timeliness runs from not from what I'll call a document dump of saying, here's a long list of Bates numbers, go figure out whether any of them are referenced in this complaint.

We discovered on or about January 17th when we got the revised complaint that one of these documents is being

cited in the complaint and is actually -- has been submitted to the Court, and within two days submitted a claw back of those and other documents, and then within five days after a complete review of all document productions issued the claw back letter of all the documents.

So even if this Court applied a timeliness requirement it runs from the date of discovery in this case, so it's a matter of a few days in terms of when it was discovered by counsel and when it was clawed back.

Then, even if one was going to apply timeliness requirement it -- the cases suggest that there -- it would valuate the prejudice. And in this case there is no prejudice to -- to the trust. They -- they shouldn't have access to a privileged document, and the fact that they do has been undone by the protective order.

So in -- in -- to this point, Your Honor, there is an obligation under the New York ethical rules for a lawyer who is in receipt of a document that appears to be privileged for that lawyer to contact the producing party.

The documents we're talking about are emails between client representatives and Greenberg Traurig, and --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Fisher makes a slightly different contention. He says they're emails between two non-lawyers and Greenberg Traurig personnel were cc'd. Is there a factual dispute on his contention?

Page 28 1 MR. FINGER: Let me verify that, Your Honor. 2 is -- that is technically true. It's an email exchange that numbers nine pages when it's printed out, and it begins with 3 an email exchange between lawyers at Weil Gotshal and 4 5 lawyers at Greenberg Traurig. And then at some point 6 lawyers at Greenberg Traurig --7 THE COURT: Okay. Weil Gotshal is the other 8 side --9 MR. FINGER: Yes. 10 THE COURT: -- from you? MR. FINGER: So that's not privileged. 11 There's a 12 -- there's a -- this is why the document was redacted rather 13 than -- than fully withheld on the grounds of privilege. 14 Through this email --15 THE COURT: Continue. 16 MR. FINGER: Through this email string Greenberg 17 Traurig lawyers forwarded to client representatives, which 18 produced a series of back and forth emails between lawyers and clients. I believe there are eight such email exchanges 19 20 back and forth discussing how to respond to what the Weil 21 Gotshal lawyer had -- had informed Greenberg Traurig. 22 The very top of that email is an email from a 23 client representative to another client representative, but 24 copying two lawyers at Greenberg Traurig. And so I don't 25 know if that's technically a factual dispute, but it's still

Page 29 1 an email exchange, several of them, that's private and 2 confidential between client representatives and lawyers at 3 Greenberg Traurig. 4 Interestingly, the case that Mr. Fisher cites in 5 -- in his response about -- for the -- the only case that's cited to suggest that this document is not privileged, and 6 7 what -- what he cites it for is the proposition that merely 8 conveying the substance of what a third party has conveyed 9 is not privileged. That's what Mr. fisher cites it for. 10 Later in that opinion -- it's the Union Box Office --11 12 THE COURT: You're talking about Ted Katz' 13 decision -- Magistrate Judge Katz' decision? MR. FINGER: Yes, Your Honor. It's Urban Box 14 15 Office Network is the name of the case. THE COURT: Yes. And -- and presumably you're 16 referring to page 2 of that decision? 17 MR. FINGER: Well, I'm referring to the specific 18 19 quote, Your Honor, when information --20 THE COURT: "For example, where the attorney or 21 client is merely conveying the substance of what a third 22 party has conveyed the communication is not privileged." 23 That's what Mr. Fisher is relying upon. 24 MR. FINGER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I was reading from Judge Katz'

decision.

Okay. Now are you saying that you disagree with Judge Katz' view of the law on that or are you saying that there's something else that Judge Katz helps you more than that?

MR. FINGER: Later in the opinion Judge Katz goes on to say -- and if the Court wants -- it's at 250 -- I don't have the pin cite to it. I can get the pin cite if you'd like me to, Your Honor. But Judge Katz goes on to say:

"When information is conveyed to an attorney, the communication need not specifically ask for legal advice in order to maintain the documents privileged status so long as the information is sent to counsel in order for counsel to provide legal advice."

That opinion cites the Buspirone Anti-trust litigation and goes on to cite the Pfizer Securities litigation and quotes it and says:

"An implied request for legal advice exists when an employee sends information to corporate counsel in order to keep them apprised of ongoing business developments with the expectation that the attorney will respond in the event the matter raises important legal issues."

That's exactly the situation that's here. There may have been discussion with third party, but sharing that with counsel as part of an ongoing string where legal advice is -- is sought and conveyed continues that privileged dialogue between lawyers and clients, and that's what -- what the case is in this particular email.

So the fact that there was a discussion with a third party does not end the inquiry. The inquiry extends to suggest that the discussion -- the fact that the information is shared expects -- is -- is, to quote Judge Kat, "an implied request for legal advice," and that's what happened in this case and, therefore, the document is, in fact, privileged.

THE COURT: You're saying that when a nonprivileged communication is shared with the attorney a privilege attaches to the non-privileged communication?

MR. FINGER: No, Your Honor. I'm saying that an -- an attorney/client communicate -- for the privilege to -- to apply there has to be the communication between a lawyer and a client for the purpose of seeking or obtaining legal advice. And that definition is met here and Judge Katz acknowledged it when, in this case, information is being conveyed to the lawyer with the expectation that it's a -- it's an implied request for legal advice and with the expectation that legal advice will be returned based on the

Page 32 1 information that's provided. 2 THE COURT: Now was the source of the 3 communication that was conveyed to the attorney with 4 somebody at new GM? MR. FINGER: Yes. And --5 6 THE COURT: And is it agreed that if Mr. Fisher 7 were to depose the guy at new GM who spoke to your Aurelius guy he could ask away with regard to that? 8 9 MR. FINGER: Yes. He can ask Mr. Benomo (ph) what 10 he said to -- to somebody else that -- that's not a privilege. He's -- he's a lawyer, but this would not be a 11 12 privileged communication. He's free to ask that question, 13 but he's not free to use a document that's protected from disclosure on the grounds of -- of the attorney/client 14 15 communication privilege. 16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 17 MR. FINGER: And that's --18 THE COURT: Anything else before I give Mr. Fisher 19 a chance to respond? 20 MR. FINGER: No, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Very well. 22 Mr. Fisher, do you wish to reply? 23 MR. FISHER: Very briefly, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Go ahead. 25 MR. FISHER: First, just to address the standard

that Your Honor should apply here, I -- it -- I agree to a certain extent that the timeliness of the request is not the same. That issue, the timeliness of the claw back is not the same as it would be in the absence of a protective order.

My understanding of the case law is that where there is a -- where there is no protective order or at least a protective order that doesn't have a claw back provision like ours, then the Court applies a reasonableness test and looks at a number of different factors, including any delay in seeking the claw back.

Where there is a protective order like ours then the standard is recklessness. But -- and we -- we -- we submit that when you tell Aurelius here are ten documents we're relying on in our complaint, please review them and tell us whether we can publicly file our complaint, they review them and say, go ahead and publicly file the complaint, that that rises to the level of recklessness.

But even separate and apart from that, we're not arguing here that it's the inadvertent disclosure that caused the waiver. We're arguing that that communication is tantamount to a knowing waiver because counsel are telling us we've looked at these documents and you can go ahead and do what you're doing with them.

With regard to Mr. Finger's point about on whose

behalf the January 5th, 2012 letter was written all I can say is that we received the letter from Greenberg Traurig.

We know who Greenberg Traurig represents. We had been going back and forth with them with all kinds of arguments about whether Aurelius should or should not be named as a defendant in the -- in the complaint. And what they told us was that our clients will not require that the draft complaint be filed under seal.

So I would say that the onus is on Greenberg

Traurig to tell us on whose behalf they're communicating if

they're only communicating supposedly on behalf of a subset

of their clients. I don't' think it's fair to construe that

letter as a letter that was not written on Aurelius' behalf.

And, finally, Your Honor, with regard to the underlying question of whether this particular document is privileged, I should say that our objective here, really, was having prepared the complaint, having gone through a revision of the complaint after receiving a lot of angry letters, and then having submitted it to the Court, we didn't want to have to revise the complaint and then go through that solicitation process again, and then if someone objected file a new motion to have the complaint filed under seal. We were trying to move things along here.

And for all the reasons I've already mentioned we think there's been a knowing waiver here. If there hasn't

been we think that at least as to these four documents the behavior was reckless.

And -- and, finally, if Your Honor doesn't find a waiver on one of those two grounds, then Your Honor needs to reach the privilege issue. Your Honor can probably best reach it by reviewing the document in question, which Your Honor doesn't have the benefit of and I don't have the benefit of having the document in front of me.

When Mr. Finger stood here with the document, we're not contending that the privileged portions of the communication should be produced to us. Of course not. They were originally produced to us in redacted form where paragraph 144 just relies on the first page of that email which is the non-privileged communication that -- that I've described to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Everybody sit in place for a minute.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Before I rule, Mr. Fisher -- never mind.

All right. Gentlemen, Ms. Cooperman, I am ruling that the protective order does not provide absolution for all time for delays in asserting rights that would otherwise apply under the protective order and that undue delay or latches could still, under certain circumstances, result in

a waiver.

But I'm further ruling that under the facts here, given the chronology, with or without the specific carve-out on behalf of Aurelius, that the Greenberg Traurig firm, on behalf of its client, sufficiently acted promptly so that I do not have a situation at the outer end where contentions as to latches or waiver by undue delay would consequently attach.

Therefore, the production of the documents will rise or fall with respect to their underlying nature as documents as to which the privilege properly could be invoked.

Putting it another way, if and to the extent that they're privileged you can't use them, and you would have to drop the statement in 144 that relied upon them, and conversely to the extent that they're not privileged you can use them as you see fit. This, of course, would, in addition, be without prejudice to your rights to depose parties on either side of a non-privileged communication to find out what either said to the other.

A separate issue, which was articulated in your letter and which exists under Judge Katz' statement of the law in Urban Box Office Network, 2006 WestLaw 1004472, with which neither side appears to disagree, is whether the privilege was properly invoked in the first place with any

-- with respect to any one of the four documents in question.

Mr. Finger, you or Mr. Zirinsky or some person acting on your behalf is to get me those four documents at your earliest reasonable convenience for in camera review. You are to also provide me, if you wish, and Mr. Fisher or his designee is to provide me, if he wishes, any cases -- and I want, as a favor to me, copies of the cases, not just giving me cites -- of any cases that either side believes I should take into account on the legal principles associated with the communication between attorney and client with respect to communications by a third party.

And if the law is different -- and I express no view on it now -- I'm pretty good on this law except with respect to cases that have come up in the last couple of years, but I want to be sure that I've gotten it right -- with respect to whether it makes a difference as to whether the lawyer is the principle addressee or is being copied, and to the extent there is a rule of law as stated by

Mr. Finger with respect to either conveying information from the third party as part of a continuing representation by the lawyer or more broadly providing the substance of the non-privileged communication to the lawyer sanitizes an otherwise non-privileged communication and makes it subject to non-disclosure.

Those are areas in which I would specifically want your assistance, but that's without prejudice to your rights to give me anything else that you think is relevant.

I well understand, Mr. Fisher, that you no longer have the document and you, are in a sense, are fighting with Mr. Finger with a hand tied behind your back, but that's the way it is. You can't do anything about that. I'm not going to require Mr. Finger to give you the document again to help you fight the fight with him.

Cases going back thirty years to a case which, if
I recall its name correctly, is J.P. Foley and Company
versus Vanderbilt, discuss the proposition that otherwise
privileged communications do not become -- let me rephrase
that -- otherwise unprivileged communications do not become
privileged because non-privileged information is
communicated by attorney to client or client to attorney,
but the issue may or may not be the same when it's part of a
continuing legal representation. And I'll give you guys,
both sides, the opportunity to brief me on that.

I also would not for half a second suggest that you exclude decisions by MJ's. The magistrate judges in this district and elsewhere are some of the most expert on these areas and I very much care what they have to say.

All right. Pending my consideration of the underlying privilege issues on those four documents,

Mr. Fisher, you are authorized to file the complaint in the clear, but with the contested paragraph 144 redacted. And after I rule I will then decide whether or not we'll declassify the redacted portion of that document.

Okay. Not by way of re-argument, do we have any further business here?

MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor. Just the status conference component of today's hearing on Nova Scotia, which I believe we've achieved a fairly broad consensus on scheduling issues and I just wanted to briefly apprise the Court of that.

THE COURT: Certainly. But I want you to come to the main lectern so I can hear you better, and then if Mr. Finger or Mr. Zirinsky wants to be heard after that, I'm going to make a similar request.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, the parties have agreed on cut-offs for the conclusion of fact depositions and also on cut-offs for expert discovery. And we -- if Your Honor wishes we can simply reflect those dates in a stipulation to be submitted to the -- to the Court.

We also envision an evidentiary hearing, which is something that we mentioned to the Court at the last status conference, and we spoke to Your Honor's deputy this morning about potential dates. And it appears that there are dates available during the week of August 6th. Ms. Blum was able

to --

THE COURT: There are indeed dates available on August 6th, but I was less clear on how many days you guys needed the aggregate.

MR. FISHER: I -- I think, Your Honor, it's of course hard to know, but we project perhaps seven or eight days, although I think we'll all try to be as efficient as possible and we appreciate that we may not be able to get all of those days consecutively on Your Honor's calendar.

So I think our approach was to sort of take as much as we -- we reasonably could given Your Honor's calendar and -- and then try our best to -- to fit the hearing into whatever time Your Honor had, and then to find supplemental dates as necessary.

So Ms. Blum was able to identify approximately five dates and said during that week -- she -- she wasn't certain whether Your Honor would want to have hearing days on the Monday, August 6th or on the Friday, August 10th. If Your Honor is open to hearing -- to having this matter heard on those dates then there are five consecutive days that -- that week, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, of course, the practical problem is that as important as -- as some people like to think that the GM case is, it's not the only case on my docket, including others that have some very major

Page 41 1 controversies and others who believe that, you know, you 2 don't have to be a mega-case to be entitled to court time. I assume that the estimate of trial time that you 3 4 have is still on the assumption that direct will go in by 5 affidavit or declaration? 6 MR. FISHER: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. All right. Let me hear from Mr. Finger or Mr. Zirinsky. 8 9 MR. ZIRINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 I -- I do think and I want to thank Mr. Fisher and 11 the other -- and counsel for the other parties in this 12 litigation that I do think we've made substantial progress 13 in terms of defining the road map to be able to present this 14 controversy to Your Honor. 15 We believe that in addition to having agreed to 16 firm deadlines for completion of fact depositions and expert 17 depositions, we -- we believe we've also agreed on some 18 maximum numbers of depositions as well, which are significant, but we've attempted -- we thought they needed 19 20 less, if any. They thought they needed a lot more, but 21 we've actually reached an agreement, you know, subject to 22 some startling development where parties could come back to see Your Honor if they needed relief. 23 24 But we -- we do think it's a significant 25 accomplishment. We've agreed to basically sixteen fact

Page 42 1 depositions by --2 THE COURT: Did you say 1-6? 3 MR. ZIRINSKY: 1-6. The original ask was over forty. So we're down to 1-6 which we think is a major feet. 4 5 We have not finalized our view, but we think we --6 from -- from our perspective we think no more than three 7 that we would be taking for a total of nineteen, and other parties have reserved rights. They may wish to try to 8 9 designate some additional parties for deposition. 10 THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Zirinsky. What parties are there besides you and -- or your clients and the 11 12 GUC Trust, and to a lesser extent, new GM? 13 MR. ZIRINSKY: We also have the Canadian 14 trustee --15 THE COURT: Oh, of course. 16 MR. ZIRINSKY: -- Nova Scotia trustee. 17 THE COURT: Green Hunt Wedlake. 18 MR. ZIRINSKY: Green Hunt Wedlake, which is --THE COURT: Oh, yes. 19 20 MR. ZIRINSKY: -- they -- they are the holder --21 the trustee is the holder of the wind up claim --22 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 23 MR. ZIRINSKY: -- under Canadian law, which is 24 disputed, obviously, by the GUC Trust. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Dublin's client.

MR. ZIRINSKY: Yes. That's correct. So those are the parties.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZIRINSKY: We did all meet and confer yesterday and I think we have a -- you know, roughly we have a -- a global agreement, and I think Mr. Fisher's suggestion that the parties endeavor to reduce this to a written stipulation to be submitted to Your Honor is a good idea.

We think the deadlines are realistic, the target deadlines are realistic. We also think that we should be able to accomplish an evidentiary hearing in five to eight days. I'm more optimistic, perhaps, than Mr. Fisher, but I do think that if Your Honor is able to carve-out time in -- in August that would be very helpful. We would all endeavor to try to complete within whatever time Your Honor was able to allocate to us.

I just want to make one -- one other comment, and that is I know Your Honor's views on dispositive motions and we had had conversations about that in the past. I just want to make it clear, and I don't think there's any disagreement on this, that we obviously are not agreeing to waive any rights or defenses or objections or -- or otherwise by agreeing to go forward on this basis without an evidentiary hearing. We assume that the schedule will allow sufficient time for pretrial briefs to be submitted to Your

Honor in advance of an evidentiary hearing.

And we might suggest that at the outset of the evidentiary hearing, or an earlier date if Your Honor wants to set that, that Your Honor might hear some argument as to try -- so that we could try to at least eliminate some of the issues that we think Your Honor may be able to dispose of without evidentiary hearing and try to narrow the focus of what actually has to get heard before Your Honor through -- through testimony.

THE COURT: Do you think there would be material incremental benefits as a result of doing so?

MR. ZIRINSKY: I believe so, yes. I believe a number of the claims can be dealt with as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. All right.

MR. ZIRINSKY: Thank you.

Mr. Steinberg, do you want to weigh in on this?

MR. STEINBERG: Yes.

Your Honor, we did file a statement in connection with the ceiling motion. There was an element that was sort of a technical situation where we wanted to close the loop, which is that we had formally been a party to the contested matter and now that they're bringing the adversary proceeding, which was done for -- to try to address the procedural objection, we wanted to be able to participate in the adversary proceeding aspect of this dispute.

All of the parties have agreed that we should be able to do that, but we would like to be able to submit an order similar to what we had done in the contested matter as a right to be heard and -- and -- in this matter. THE COURT: Well, you've got that right under term loan lenders Caldor (ph), right? MR. STEINBERG: I certainly have the right to be heard, but this is an adversary proceeding --THE COURT: A right to intervene. MR. STEINBERG: Right. I -- that's correct. THE COURT: And under my ruling in Adelphia (ph) you have that right to intervene, but the extent to which you would participate would depend on the circumstances as to the level of your participation and what you want to do, and it wouldn't equate to ownership of the cause of action except insofar as you otherwise have one under law. You understand all of that? MR. STEINBERG: That -- that's true, Your Honor. But to remember what's in the contested matter, they are bringing a Rule 60 motion to upset the sale order and things like that. They have not withdrawn that aspect of it. That's the reason why we sought to participate in the contested matter. When you read through the draft -- the complaint that -- that's going to be filed, there are elements as to

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whether the lock up agreement which gives GM Canada a post

-- a release should somehow be potentially vitiated, which
obviously affects new GM and the sale order. These are very
critical issues for new GM and a reason why it needs to
participate in this matter.

And that's the reason why -- but we're not looking to -- to take what is an objection to claim matter and try to say that that is a new GM prerogative. But we will be saying that -- that as part of the sale order there were certain assets that conveyed to new GM that the GUC Trust may not pursue and that they are trying to do that.

And -- and to pick up on Mr. Zirinsky's point, it didn't seem to be a -- too appropriate, especially in light of Your Honor's prior remarks at other status conferences, that you were interested in any kind of dispositive motions to at least narrow the dispute. I don't think the dispute goes away. I think there will be an evidentiary trial on the claims itself.

But one of the things that we try to do in responding to the ceiling motion is to try to address the fact that there's a lot of things in there that we think are inappropriate to be brought. And, in fact, one of the reasons why this complaint was revised was because there were factual errors that they corrected themselves when we pointed them out to them. They didn't correct all of it.

And we're hoping that at the conclusion of the discovery of the depositions that we may be able to address to Your Honor certain issues that will streamline any kind of evidentiary trial.

For example, I have a hard time envisioning at the end of the day why the committee, now the GUC Trust, should be able to vitiate the sale order. That is an element that's still here, but we hope that that's not going to be an issue that's in the evidentiary trial.

The GUC Trust may come to that conclusion itself at the -- at the end of the depositions. They may come to the conclusion at the end of the depositions that there was no improper post-petition transaction.

Therefore, I didn't want to try to force that issue now. I want them to either evolve to what I think would be the right decision or to have the opportunity to address that to Your Honor so that you don't have an eight-day trial, but you have a much shorter streamline trial.

I also think, Your Honor, that this case would -would have the benefit of an adjourned status conference
just so that Your Honor would be able to monitor what was
going on, because it is going -- I mean, you -- Your Honor
knows that there's potentially nineteen depositions in this
case. I mean, the depositions including Weil, Gotshal,
Kramer, Levin, the government, the U.S. government, the

Canadian government. That's the wish list that people have in this case in connection with this noteholder dispute.

Now they want to try to do it. I can't tell them they shouldn't take their depositions now, but I do know that they're -- they're certainly going to the far -- the farthest boundary of what is relevant for purposes of whether certain claims filed in this case should be deemed disallowed or -- either in total or partial.

so I think we need another status conference date, and it could be just a holding date to report to Your Honor. But if we're actually going to get this case to be tried in August or to be resolved in August, I think that it needs further judicial monitoring of what's going on because, as you can see from the ceiling motion response that we filed, we are terrifically unhappy with some of the things that are happening here, but we have decided that now is not the right time to further address those issues.

and we do reserve the opportunity to do so before an evidentiary trial. We just think that Your Honor has to let them go through the process of the depositions, but some of these depositions are very, very far ranging and -- and we think are -- are not necessarily appropriate. But we're not going to do the noteholders' bidding. We -- we're going to protect our interest and do what's required under the lock-

Page 49 1 up agreement. 2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Mr. Dublin, anything to add? 3 4 MR. DUBLIN: No, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 Mr. Fisher, Mr. Zirinsky, the way that some people 7 talked about it was as the claims objection. Am I right in assuming that it also includes trial on the equitable 8 9 subordination and equitable disallowance claims? 10 MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Zirinsky, you agree? 12 MR. ZIRINSKY: That's in their complaint, Your 13 Honor, yes. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else, 15 anybody? 16 All right. Here's what we're going to do, folks. 17 You're going to give me two separate stips to which, if I 18 understand it correctly, there would be four parties each. One dealing with scheduling and one dealing with 19 20 intervention for new GM into the adversary, each of which, 21 if reasonable, I'll so order. 22 The intervention stip should, in addition to 23 giving new GM the right to intervene, to which I think it's 24 plainly entitled, either agreements or reservations of 25 rights with respect to matters that are addressed in my

Adelphia decision that was execute -- that I issued shortly after term loan lenders Caldor was issued.

And if I recall correctly there was a decision of the Second Circuit, in a case whose name I've forgotten, that at least seemingly approved things I said in that case, and Judge Chin (ph) who I think was then a district judge, and I think Sunbeam, wherein it was stated or implied that intervention is not the same as owning causes of action.

You'll have reservations of rights on those things, but put in as much as you can that you can agree upon.

I think Mr. Steinberg's recommendation that there be a status conference between now and August is a good one, but I need you to put your noodles together to give me a recommendation, jointly, if possible, on the zone of time when you think that would be most productive.

I'll tell you guys now that you'll have at least three trial dates -- or three trial days in the week of August 3rd, and if my schedule permits more, but I don't know yet what I'm going to be able to give you.

I sense from what you're saying now that unless either side hits a home run on dispositive motions or narrowing motions or whatever Mr. Zirinsky calls it, we're not going to finish the week of August 3rd no matter how many days I give you, but that will at least be a start.

Lastly, I want you to focus, if you're thinking

Page 51 1 about the motions of the type that Mr. Zirinsky talked 2 about, what kind of bang for the buck any such motion would result in, even if successful, because I care about the 3 4 incremental benefits of those, and trying an extra issue or 5 two when you're having a trial anyway doesn't get you that 6 much more or less than it might if that issue were to go 7 away. All right. Anything else, either side? 8 9 All right. Five-minute recess, only five, and 10 then I'll take the GUC Trust funding issues. 11 THE CLERK: All rise. 12 (Recess at 11:05 p.m.) 13 THE COURT: Have seats, please. All right. On the GUC Trust motion for leave to 14 15 liquidate securities. 16 Let me get appearances and then ask you all to sit 17 down. MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, Matthew Williams, 18 Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher for the GUC Trust and the 19 Avoidance Action Trust administrator. 20 21 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Williams. 22 MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor. 23 with me is my colleague, Keith Martorana and my partner, 24 Mitchell Karlan. 25 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear your

Page 52 1 colleagues names, Mr. Williams. 2 MR. WILLIAMS: Mitchell Karlan, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Karlan? MR. WILLIAMS: And -- Mitchell Karlan and Keith 4 5 Martorana. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. LEARY: Good morning, Your Honor. Maureen Leary on behalf of the State of New York. 8 9 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Leary. 10 MR. DUBLIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Phil Dublin, Akin Gump on behalf of Green Hunt Wedlake. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Zirinsky. 13 MR. ZIRINSKY: Bruce Zirinsky, Your Honor, Greenberg Traurig, on behalf of certain noteholders. 14 15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jones for the U.S. 16 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. JONES: David Jones, U.S. Attorney's Office. 19 Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 Okay. Folks, make your presentations as you see 22 fit, but I want you to address some particular questions and 23 concerns that I have, because I have problems with positions 24 by both sides. 25 As Green Hunt Wedlake properly notes I do approach

objections on the part of Green Hunt Wedlake and the Nova

Scotia bondholders with skepticism where I'm seeing once

again -- and I don't know how many times I've seen this over

my judicial tenure -- efforts to attack ones adversary

through the purse strings.

But with that said, I do have concerns about several aspects of the request.

When you look at it with a less litigation driven view as New York State does, although I well understand that New York State is in litigation with the estate as well, I don't see a discrimination issue; that is, an issue vis-à-vis different treatment of creditors, although just as I made creditors deal with the vagaries of movements in the stock market, vis-à-vis delays in getting paid, I am strongly inclined to do the same for professionals and for anyone else who's going to be getting money out of a stock that by necessity can go up or down in value.

Other issues, however, are more troublesome to me.

Both sides, I don't see that much of a ripeness issue with respect to 2011 cost overruns and efforts to fund those, but I do see ripeness issues with respect to expenses anticipated for 2012. And I want both sides to address whether my view, based on my reading of the briefs in that regard, should be modified.

I was surprised and disappointed to see how much

people were talking about for tax-related matters,
especially since -- and you can correct me -- but I could
swear that I was told by Tom Mayer (ph) that if I decided
the issue of the ownership controversy between the U.S.
government and the GUC Trust -- excuse me -- the Avoidance
Action Trust by the December 15th deadline that Mr. Mayer
told me about that that had put the issue of disputed
ownership assets off the table from a tax perspective. And
suddenly the need to spend what seems to be a huge amount of
money on tax issues is one where I need some help.

I cannot for the life of me see how the GUC Trust or the Avoidance Trust, either one, can be spending more than a peppercorn on the term loan action since you're both -- the GUC Trust/Avoidance Trust on the one hand -- I guess it's the Avoidance Trust here -- and JP Morgan on the other would -- I would have thought be doing nothing more than waiting for my decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment, which are now sub judice.

The issue, it seems to me, under the plan documents is not whether Wilmington Trust and the others can ask for me to authorize the sale of securities, but whether I should grant it. And I ask both sides whether I'm a rubber stamp on that issue on the one hand or whether I do have a responsibility to be determining whether the creditors in this case are entitled to their money's worth

in terms of the management of the trust assets going forward.

A statement was made to me, which all seem to acknowledge was made to me, that going forward the GUC Trust was on a detailed and inflexible budget, or words to that effect, and when I overruled an objection by Ms. Leary and maybe one or two others where they had then expressed as a confirmation objection failures to provide more formalized procedures for cost management that was one of the things that I had been told would form the basis for that conclusion. And the question that I now have for you all is whether and to what extent I should hold people to that.

I also want both sides to address the extent, if any, to which I should slice and dice the particular requests for relief or the particular funding requests by an applicant by applicant basis or a cause for relief in that basis.

I am particularly troubled by requests where parties proposed to me and to the creditor community that they get paid X-hundred-thousand-dollars or \$50,000 or \$100,000 per month, and now determine that that wasn't a good deal for them. That is a matter of concern to me.

It could have been drafted; that is the underlying trust documentation could have been drafted kind of like the contracts that I dealt with when I was in the Air Force on a

cost plus fixed fee basis and people chose not to do that.

I also see more incremental base -- benefit in the services provided by Jay Alix than some of the others, but people can and should address that.

Also, if I understand the figures correctly, there are about three-and-a-half-million bucks in cost overruns for 2011 which, if I'm not mistaken, are about half for counsel and I believe the other half are for financial advisory services.

I want to know what percentage of the total they are and I want to get a better handle on why they were incurred and how I deal with the tension between -- in a situation where it was expressly agreed that there wouldn't be fee apps, wouldn't be U.S. Trustee review, wouldn't be fee examiner review, but the fees were nevertheless presumably assumed to be subject to some reasonableness test.

With that said I'll let you guys address those issues, starting with you, Mr. Williams.

As implicit in what I said, I am concerned about the creditors in this case getting their money's worth, and I'm concerned about avoiding prejudice or at least material prejudice to the creditors in this case who are looking to the leadership of the GUC Trust to continue to deliver value to them as this claims process is continuing.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. Matthew
Williams for Gib -- of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher for
Wilmington Trust in its capacity as GUC Trust administrator
and the GUC Trust -- and the Avoidance Action Trust
administrator.

I'll -- if it's okay with Your Honor, I'll get to right to your questions, although I would like to just give you a brief update of the status of some discussions we've had with various parties.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: First, in connection with the tax issue, we had initially requested a \$17 million reserve of -- of tax, not to sell the \$17 million worth of stuff, but to transfer it to the Avoidance Action Trust in the event a tax issue arose.

We've subsequently withdrawn that request. We've been having numerous discussions with the IRS as well as internally and ultimately we've determined that we're not going to need that contingency funding for that \$17 million. So that's been withdrawn.

THE COURT: That's obviously very helpful. To what extent, then, am I asked to authorize sales of securities for other tax advice or does that take it all off the table?

MR. WILLIAMS: No. There's still -- we still do

need tax advice, Your Honor. There are still a lot of tax issues ongoing. Most of that's with -- again, how this works, if Your Honor will recall, is tax advice is generally dealt with, at least with respect to the GUC Trust as this reporting and transfer costs, notwithstanding the fact that it doesn't deal with reporting and transfer, given the fact that the Department of Treasury was not willing to fund that we -- we -- we agreed that it would come out of reporting and transfer cost, but --

THE COURT: What do you mean by recording and transfer? I thought that whatever other people disagree with and -- when you do it on 363 sales, if you transfer assets under a plan you're off the hook on recording and transfer taxes.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no, no, I'm sorry. Reporting with a P, Your Honor, reporting and transfer. It's a defined term in the GUC Trust agreement.

If Your Honor will recall, the GUC Trust agreement

-- and the plan itself provided that it -- or anticipated

that the GUC Trust units would actually be transferable. In

order to do that we, the GUC Trust, are going to incur what

are called -- what we -- what is defined in a GUC Trust

agreement as reporting and transfer costs.

THE COURT: As a proxy for 34 Act and 33 Act compliance?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. And in order to get up to speed and to deal with all sorts of issues that we're currently negotiating with the SEC.

But, in addition -- I'm sorry, I didn't mean to cut you off, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, it -- it had appeared to me, but I'll need to hear from Mr. Zirinsky or Mr. Dublin on this, that on that issue you didn't have opposition from the Nova Scotia bondholders and Green Hunt Wedlake.

MR. WILLIAMS: I think that's correct, Your Honor, but just to be clear, when we talk about reporting and transfer costs it's not -- you know, it's a bit of a misnomer in the trust agreement because the trust agreement -- reporting and transfer costs cover -- cover a couple of things. It covers the SEC stuff that we -- that I was just talking about, and it also covers certain -- this private letter ruling that we're seeking with the IRS, and it also covers the dispute over the term loan ownership litigation. Obviously, treasury wasn't willing to fund that because they've taken the position on appeal now that they own the term loan ownership litigation.

So my only point being, Your Honor, is when we talk about reporting and transfer costs, it's actually not just reporting and transfer costs. There are some other things in there as well. It's not all tax advice, but it's

a lot of the tax analysis goes into the reporting and transfer costs. Other tax advice, with respect to the Avoidance Action Trust, we still do need.

For instance, Your Honor, the Avoidance Action

Trust agreement itself requires -- doesn't -- doesn't

authorize, it requires the Avoidance Action Trustee to do a

tax valuation of the underlying litigation. That actually

takes time and money and we have to hire professionals to do

it. So --

THE COURT: I mean, you know, I was a general purpose litigator before I came over to the bankruptcy side. Is there some way by which your guys think that they should be valuing the litigation other than estimating the probability that the Avoidance Trust is going to win on the one hand or JP Morgan and its syndicate are going to win on the other?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, absolutely, Your Honor. There is a number of different variables. And, again, I haven't been hired to do the analysis, but I've seen drafts of it and there are a number of variables, including the value of the leftover collateral, for instance.

THE COURT: I see now.

MR. WILLIAMS: There's also collection risk.

THE COURT: Because underlying that is the point that while the UCC-3 in question involved the biggest chunk

of collateral, it wasn't all the collateral.

MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly, Your Honor. And it -- and another issue is collection risk, obviously; another issue is time value of money, discounting to present value.

We as the GUC Trust administrator have to prepare a tax analysis that's ultimately going to hold up to an audit if that ultimately comes, and because of that if -these are the kind of things, Your Honor, that seem simple when you first look at the trust agreement, or you know, you prepare a tax analysis of the avoidance action, but when you actually delve into it and -- and again, I haven't been hired to do that analysis, so, you know, I can speak generally to it, but it takes time and it takes money. And at the end of the day it's Wilmington Trust and to a lesser extent, but to a significant extent the GUC Trust monitor that have to sign off on these analyses. And because of that, you know, we want to make sure that it's done right.

THE COURT: The GUC Trust monitor is FTI?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. The FTI is the GUC Trust

monitor and the Avoidance Action Trust monitor, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: With -- and one other, you know, speaking up for my former colleague, Tom Mayer, he was -- he was -- you know, we all thought that if Your Honor ruled we wouldn't have the issue of the disputed ownership fund.

Treasury appealed obviously, and that threw a bit of a monkey wrench into the works. But, you know, as I stated earlier, we're no longer seeking to send that \$17 million in stock over for a number of reasons. One, because -- and, again, with the -- with the idea that things are always more complicated than they seem in this matter -- it could have potentially created 12(g) reporting for the Avoidance Action Trust had we done that --

THE COURT: 12(g) under the 34 Act?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, because we would have had holders of over -- over -- I believe it's 500 holders, Your Honor, and over --

THE COURT: Requiring you to file a Form 10?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. So rather -- so that was one

reason we ultimately determined not to do it.

Subsequently, we've been in continued discussions with the IRS, and it turns out that the IRS, so long as we

going to take the position that the GUC Trust is a disputed ownership fund, not withstanding treasury's appeal. So -- so that's a good thing. But, again, this is the kind of

get some other issues resolved with them, that they're not

What -- a couple of other just general updates, Your Honor.

stuff that is taking time and money to resolve.

The Nova Scotia trustee had filed a limited

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objection and their limited objection was really a request for more information; you know, what professionals were over, by how much, how much did we anticipate professionals were going to be over in 2012?

We filed a couple of declarations. We filed the declaration of David Vinasky (ph) of Wilmington Trust where we tried to outline that information. We filed a declaration by FTI, and we filed a declaration by -- by Alix Partners, all, you know, dealing with certain issues. Each of them are here to -- for cross-examination to the extent that they --

THE COURT: Well, you know that's not the way we deal with contest -- contested evidentiary issues either under the local rules of this Court, my case management order, or even Rule 9014; that the return date on a motion is never an evidentiary hearing.

MR. WILLIAMS: I -- I apologize, Your Honor. I -I thought that we had complied with Your Honor's chambers
rules by submitting those declarations and making the
witnesses available here to testify.

THE COURT: Did you contact my chambers and tell me that you had contemplated having an evidentiary hearing today? These affidavits, if I recall there were three of them, were submitted as part of a reply brief.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor. If I

Page 64 1 could just confer with my colleague for one second. 2 (Pause) 3 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, we had provided those -- the answer to your question is unfortunately no, we did 4 5 not contact chambers and say that we wanted an evidentiary 6 hearing today. I apologize for that, Your Honor, it was an 7 oversight on my part. To the extent that -- you know, we had provided 8 9 those declarations because the parties had asked for 10 additional information. If there's a need to schedule a subsequent evidentiary hearing obviously we'd be amenable to 11 12 that. 13 THE COURT: If your affidavits address their concerns and they're satisfied of course the issue goes 14 15 away. 16 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, well --17 THE COURT: But if there are material disputed 18 issues of fact, the National Bankruptcy Rules, the way that 9014 was amended to deal with evidentiary hearings, and what 19 20 I have said in baby talk in my case management orders this 21 is certainly miscontrol. 22 MR. WILLIAMS: We understand, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Continue, please. 24 MR. WILLIAMS: But I guess at least with respect 25 to Nova Scotia -- the Nova Scotia trustee, the good news is,

is that the declarations did resolve their concerns.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: We -- now again, I -- that is not the case or at least I can't speak for, you know, the other two objecting parties, but with respect to Nova Scotia, you know, we had helpful discussions, they told us what they wanted, we tried to include, you know, by line item in the declarations, you know, by professional, who's over by how much and the like, and because of that I believe Nova Scotia has -- the trustee has agreed to withdraw its objection.

We've also agreed in order to provide full disclosure just generally to all parties in interest that on a going forward basis the GUC Trust files what are called 6.2 reports -- it's 6.2 because it's Section 6.2 of the GUC Trust agreement -- and we've agreed going forward -- these are quarterly reports filed with the SEC and the like -- we've agreed that we're going provide that information on a going forward basis in the 6.2 reports.

So there's going to be line items akin to what's in the Vinasky declaration, I believe it's on page 1 of Exhibit B of the Vinasky declaration, we're going to provide a form like that going forward so people can get an idea as to what professionals are spending and how much.

With respect to Your Honor's particular questions,

I'm happy to just delve right into them.

Your first question was about ripeness, why are we asking Your Honor to sell stock for 2012 anticipated overages, notwithstanding the fact that those fees and expenses haven't been incurred yet? There's a couple of reasons, Your Honor.

expensive. Any time we have to sell stock we have to notice, you know, every allowed claimant, every disputed claimant, it's an expensive process, and given the fact that we were over by 011 and we were making the motion to -- you know, again, it's a line item budget -- so given the fact that certain professionals were over for 2011 and we were making the motion the GUC Trust administrator thought that it was prudent given the fact that based upon all the information available to it we are going to be over for 2012, that it made sense to make this motion now.

So that's really the first reason.

THE COURT: How expensive is it?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I don't -- the answer is I don't know. I mean we -- you know, obviously you saw our motion and our reply so this has been a relatively expensive process. The noticing itself is expensive. We, Wilmington Trust, you know, noticing the bondholders actually isn't that expensive because we can just push it out through DTC, but noticing the actual claimants it's,

Page 67 1 right, it's every claimant, every --2 THE COURT: Is there a reason why I was -- the documentation was structured to provide notice to every 3 creditor --4 5 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: -- instead of the way we more commonly 7 do it in Chapter 11 cases? MR. WILLIAMS: I believe so, Your Honor. And the 8 reason for that is because what Your Honor eluded to 9 10 earlier, which is this is an important motion and creditors 11 who are otherwise entitled to this stock should get notice 12 as to how their stock is being used and why. And I believe 13 it was the creditors' committee's concern that if the GUC 14 administrator was going to make a determination that it 15 wanted to sell stock because it was the best interest of 16 creditors that every creditor should get notice of it. 17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Continue. 18 MR. WILLIAMS: And in this vain, Your Honor, you know, I do think it's telling, obviously it's not 19 20 dispositive nor near disclose positive, but no creditor with 21 merely allowed claims has objected to the motion. So I do 22 think that the process works. It's expensive, but it works. 23 Also with respect to ripeness and because I think 24 in part that the document requires that we have to notice 25 everybody under the sun, the document also only allows for

-- the GUC Trust agreement itself only allows us to make this motion on a semiannual basis. So we're not allowed to come in every couple of months and make a motion to sell stock, the document explicitly says we can only make a motion on a semiannual basis.

So, you know, I've got a shot here, I've got a shot at some point in the future. So that's the second reason.

And then the third reason is that the GUC Trust administrator has determined that it wants to incentivize its professionals and make sure that they're paid on a timely basis so we can get this work done quickly and get out quickly.

How the budget works, how the budget works with treasury we're allowed -- you know, the GUC Trust is allowed to pay professionals for 2012 up to a certain amount and that's it, and then they have to wait till 2013 and then we can start paying them again out of the 2013 budget. What we wanted to avoid is any kind of slow down in the work.

We know that we're going to be over budget based upon the -- based upon all the due diligence that the GUC Trust administrator has done, and we want to be able to make sure that professionals can get paid so we can continue to get this work done in a timely manner. So because of -- for all of those reasons we do think that this motion is ripe

Page 69 1 and that it makes sense to sell the stock now. 2 Now what we haven't done, Your Honor, we did 3 reserve, you know, based upon -- we extrapolated out through 4 2014 what we thought we were going need. We have not sought 5 to sell stock for 2013 or 2014 because -- just because of 6 the vagaries of it. 7 You know, 2012 it's relatively easy to figure out. I shouldn't say easy -- nothing is easy in this case, 8 9 Your Honor -- but it's -- we have a relatively good handle 10 on what 2012 is going to be, we think we know what 2013 and 11 2014 is going to be, but the truth is we don't. Things 12 continue to pop up, you know, new claims continue to get 13 filed, you know, we continue to be sued and --THE COURT: Wait. New claims continue to be filed 14 15 16 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. 17 THE COURT: -- after the bar dates? 18 MR. WILLIAMS: After the bar date new claims continue to be filed, Judge. I -- look, it's -- they're 19 20 easy to knock out, but you know --21 THE COURT: You can do it with a second year 22 associate can't you --23 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, but Your Honor --24 THE COURT: -- after he or she has been admitted 25 to the bar for about two weeks?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Your Honor, to be clear, new claims being filed is not -- we're not spending a lot of time and effort on it, but it's one of many things. Right, we've been sued as Your Honor knows we have to come in here, and you know, sometimes people withdraw the suits consensually sometimes they don't.

But in any event, so for 2012, you know, we think we have a good handle on it. For 2013 and 2014 we think we have an okay handle on it but we're not sure, and so we hadn't sought, even though the stock is reserved, because per the GUC Trust agreement we're not required to seek Court authority to reverse the stock, just to sell it, we've withheld stock from distribution in case that it turns out that, you know, 2013 and 2014 are over as well. But we're not seeking to sell that at this time, because the truth is we may not need it.

We hope that we don't need it and we hope that we can make -- distribute that stock out to creditors, but for 2012 we are confident that we're going to need the vast majority of this money.

With respect -- I should say one caveat, Judge,
which is everything I just said it's a little bit different
with respect to the Avoidance Action Trust for one reason,
which is notwithstanding the fact that we are seeking to
sell stock just for 2012 for the GUC Trust, for the

Avoidance Action Trust we're seeking it to fund what we think is going to be through the life of the trust. And the reason for that is it harkens back to what I had said -- talked earlier about, which is this -- these transferable units of the GUC Trust.

You know, we've been, and as noted in our papers, we've been in lengthy discussions with is SEC about implementing a plan provision that would have to GUC Trust units transferable. Right now, you know, today taking a snapshot, the GUC Trust and the Avoidance Action Trust have the exact same beneficiaries, i.e., unsecured creditors of the estate, they're both in essence frozen in amber. So now there's no prejudice to GUC Trust holders to the extend that we were to fund the Avoidance Action Trust with GUC Trust cash because they're the same beneficiaries.

Obviously, you know, in 2013 we're hopeful. You know, that may not be the case because the GUC Trust units may be transferring, and it's for that reason that we've sought to fund the Avoidance Action Trust, you know, through 2014 right now.

So that was the -- so you know, I said we're not selling stock for 2013/2014 for the GUC Trust, but we are seeking authority to do that for the Avoidance Action Trust.

With respect to the -- Your Honor had had questions about the -- you know, you assumed that we're just

waiting on the term loan avoidance action, why is there -you know, why do we need more funding for that now? I think
I addressed it earlier, which is, you know, a couple of
things.

The Avoidance Action Trust provides for a couple things. One it provides that we're acquired to do that tax valuation, which you know, I described earlier, which isn't as simple as it seems. It also requires -- doesn't give us permissive authority, it requires us to get insurance, and obtaining insurance --

THE COURT: What kind of insurance?

MR. WILLIAMS: You know, liability insurance for the GUC Trust monitor in the avoidance action -- I'm sorry -- for the Avoidance Action Trust --

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, it is, Your Honor. And I would have thought, Your Honor, that the D&O insurance would have been very cheap for this trust. The truth of the matter is it's not. It's very expensive. There's -- I believe it's a \$2.5 million deductible that, you know, we're not seeking -- that we need to know that we have, so we've got to sell stock for that just to have it, and it's also I believe the insurance itself it's -- if I'm correct, and it's in our -- it's in the exhibits, I believe it's something like a million two. It's expensive. And one of

the reasons for that is --

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. And the reason -and again, this is required by the document that says -- and
you know, we with the monitor, the Avoidance Action Trust
administrator, you know, we went out looking for insurance
and we were surprised how expensive it was, but that's the
best deal that we could get. People were having a hard time
getting a handle about, you know, what kind of animal this
document is, and for that reason insurance was much more
expensive.

THE COURT: The premium for it is a million two?

So it's those types of things that keep popping up, which is why we need funding. And obviously the prosecution of the action itself, although it's currently stayed, ultimately it's not going to be stayed, and so we're going to -- the truth is we're going to need more money to fund that litigation.

I don't think that on a billion five action whatever we have remaining in -- I don't think we're going to have anything remaining in the Avoidance Action Trust after we pay the insurance and the like, so the issue is, well, how do we fund the action? And there were really -- there was a decision --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. WILLIAMS: Go ahead, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- forgive me, Mr. Williams.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

THE COURT: But you said a couple of minutes ago that the reason for the valuation services was that you can't measure the value of the litigation even if one, by the gross amount of the debt that was paid to JP Morgan Chase in satisfaction of the -- as agent I guess in satisfaction of the underlying obligation because there's other collateral out there, and of course you've got to arbitrage it by the likelihood of success.

I take it you're not retreating from any of those observations, so it isn't exactly a one and a half billion dollar litigation, especially since if you win you still got to give JP Morgan Chase and its syndicate the unsecured claims that are undisputed.

MR. WILLIAMS: I agree with that 100 percent, nor am I retreating from that statement.

There's -- to be frank, there's other issues with the litigation as well. There's collection risk because we've got to go out to each, you know, hedge fund that, you know, bought into this and see -- you know, we -- you know, see if -- so there's all sorts of issues, I agree, but at the end of the day, right, even -- I don't want to -- I don't want to disclose obviously what our valuation ultimately is, but I think it's fair to say that it's

significant, not withstanding all of those contingencies and issues that, you know, Your Honor just described, and I think it's to -- I think it's fair to say -- actually I know it's fair to say that the Avoidance Action Trust administrator in its fiduciary duties for the holders of units in that trust has determined that it makes sense to adequately fund it and it's going to benefit all unsecured creditors, and it wasn't a decision we took lightly.

There were other things we could have done,

Your Honor, with respect to the Avoidance Action Trust, and
we've explored some of those alternatives.

For instance, we explored and we're in the process of exploring -- to the extent that Your Honor doesn't grant the motion with respect to the Avoidance Action Trust -- alternative funding arrangements with both counsel and with outside lenders who, you know, might be willing to loan money to the Avoidance Action Trust.

But based upon our, you know, preliminary discussions with some of those lenders and what that -- what that construct would be they're going to want a significant piece of -- for all the contingencies and you know uncertainties in the action we just described, any money that they're going to loan they're going to want a significant piece of the avoidance action litigation, the underlying litigation. And the avoidance action

administrator and the avoidance action monitor and of course their fiduciary duties believe that it's more responsible and it's going to be -- hopefully return a larger recovery to unsecured creditors doing it this way.

And again, which is why we noticed it out to all the creditors and all creditors have had an opportunity to come in and object.

But -- so we're comfortable and we believe that this is the best approach.

THE COURT: Continue, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor had asked if it was appropriate for you to rubber stamp this motion. I -- absolutely not. I -- neither the -- certainly from the GUC Trust administrator's point of view it is not appropriate for you to rubber stamp this motion. It's -- this is an important motion.

We, the -- Wilmington Trust, who is chair of the official creditors' committee, we fought hard with treasury to try to get as much funding for this trust as we could, and the truth is we did the best that we could, and unfortunately notwithstanding all of our efforts and the committees' efforts and the debtors' efforts, there's not enough money to resolve all the claims and get distributions out the door in a timely manner right now, there's just not. But the GUC Trust agreement provides -- you know,

anticipating this the GUC Trust agreement provided that the GUC Trust administrator could sell stock after a motion to all creditors and upon hearing to the Court. So I don't think you should rubber stamp it.

In the same vain though I would note that these -it's not as if these fees aren't reviewed. All the fees
that are being sought here are, you know, are subject to a
number of different reviews under the GUC Trust agreement,
which we described, you know, back at confirmation, which
remain in force today.

First, you know, given that treasury is funding the wind down all the bills go to treasury. All right, so treasury, I think it's fair to say, has been a very tough negotiator in this case and I don't see why they would stop now with respect to the fees. So they get all of the fees.

Second, the GUC Trust monitor reviews all of the fee statements and after -- you know, after a 15-day waiting period, and then -- for reasonableness -- and as does the GUC Trust administrator, so there's three levels.

But then there's a fourth, right? Which is to the extent that --

THE COURT: All right, the first two being treasury and FTI?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, treasury, FTI.

The third being the GUC Trust administrator

Page 78 1 reviews after that 15-day period. 2 THE COURT: Is that Alix or is that somebody else? 3 MR. FISCHER: No, that's my client, Your Honor. 4 That's Wilmington Trust. 5 THE COURT: Oh, that's Wilmington Trust. 6 MR. WILLIAMS: That's Wilmington trust, yeah. 7 THE COURT: All right, continue. MR. WILLIAMS: And then on top of that any 8 9 professional that goes over its line item budget for any 10 year gets subject to a penalty, and the penalty is they don't get their 10 percent hold back until the end of the 11 12 case. 13 And then on top of that is really the fifth layer of protection which is this motion, Your Honor, which is --14 15 and again -- and by the way I should note, that by this 16 motion none of the professionals who have gone over budget 17 for 011 or who are anticipated to go over budget for 2012 18 are getting that 10 percent hold back paid. That's there until the conclusion of the case or until, you know, they're 19 20 gone from the case, but they don't get that. And the GUC 21 Trust administrator is not seeking authority to pay that 22 right now. 23 These professionals went over budget and it may 24 have been -- actually we think it was justified in these

cases, but you know, the agreement says what it says, this

was the deal that treasury cut and we're stuck to live by it.

So we think -- the GUC Trust administrator thinks that this process is working.

We're in the procedure now where we've let the Court and all creditors know that, you know, we're over by this amount, we've given more information -- substantially more information than was ever acquired in the disclosure statement.

If you look at the disclosure statement budget,

Your Honor, it's vague, and it was -- and maybe this was my

fault, but in our initial motion that we made to the Court

we in essence used the disclosure statement budget as kind

of the proxy and we sort of laid it out, then when creditors

asked for more information -- it wasn't that we were trying

to hide the ball -- we said, okay, here's some more

information, here's the by line item professional. But -
so there's many layers of protection here on the fees.

I don't think that, you know, professionals who had -- because and again, one other thing I note,

Your Honor, is the professionals who are doing most of the wind down work are the professionals who were involved in a lot of the case obviously, they're close to the case, they know the issues. I don't see why the minute that the plan goes effective that all these -- it's all these

professionals are going to raid the till and start over billing, especially because to the extent that one, we've got the budget, we're going to know that you're over budget and you're going to be subject to this 10 percent hold back. And moreover there isn't any certainty because -- that you're going to get paid, because again, we've got to make the motion to the Court and the GUC Trust administrator and the monitor and treasury all have to review the fees to see that they're reasonable.

THE COURT: Then why do I see partners litigating with prose's?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, partners litigating with prose's, I -- again, I am personally not close to the claims reconciliation issues.

As I said earlier, you know, I represent
Wilmington Trust, I represent it as an indenture trustee
during the case and as chair of the committee and so I
stayed on with them in their kind of court for capacity as
the GUC Trust administrator and the Avoidance Action Trust
administrator.

To the extent that Your Honor has particular concerns about how certain of the claims reconciliation, you know, litigation has been done I've -- Mr. Joe Malinsky (ph) of Walagoshal (ph) is here in the courtroom and he can address any particular concerns Your Honor has about

particular claims or just the claims reconciliation procedures in general.

THE COURT: Go on.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor had made reference and a number of the papers make reference to the detailed and inflexible budget. That is the case. I mean, and that's one of the reasons that we're here.

On an aggregate basis for 2011 we were actually a little bit under budget, the GUC Trust, but on the line item basis we were over. And -- but that's -- again, but the detailed on inflexible budget is one layer of control, but it was never anticipated nor does the document provide anywhere that professionals are only entitled to be paid from the budgeted amounts that's been authorized to be paid by treasury. What the document provides is to the extent that you go over we have to go through this process, and that's what we're going.

And again I'd note as I said earlier, that this detailed and inflexible budget, which it certainly is. I would note that, you know, when we realized we were going to be over budget for 2012 we went back and pushed on treasury and we said, look, we're over, you guys -- you guys did very well on your budget, you negotiated a good budget, but we need more money. And the answer is they said no. We asked if were could roll up the 2012 numbers into 2011, if we

pushed 2013, we tried to -- you know, we asked for all sorts of relief in connection with the budget and treasury's response was in essence no. So it is a detailed and inflexible budget.

But the problem with -- right, that's a good thing and a bad thing. Because to the extent -- right, it's good in that it keeps professionals honest, but it's bad to the extent that the GUC Trust administrator or the Avoidance Action Trust administrator isn't going to be able to compensate its professionals to do the work. Because if we're in that situation, Judge, this case is going to take longer. I really think it's going to take longer and it's not going to be a quicker case.

With respect to the proposed increases of the

Avoidance Action Trust administrator and the Avoidance

Action Trust monitor as well as the GUC Trust administrator

and the GUC Trust monitor.

Again, Your Honor was correct, initially it has been -- set forth in the budget as flat fees for both Wilmington Trust as administrator and for FTI as monitor, and no one is seeking to recut that deal with respect to 2011, that sort of is what it is.

The truth of the matter is and as we -- it's taken substantially more time not only for the professionals to resolve the claims and the like, but for Wilmington Trust

Pg 83 of 131 Page 83 and FTI it's taken them substantially more time in this engagement. And what the trust agreement provides, it doesn't provide that they're -- they get a flat fee, it says that they get their quote reasonable fee. So when --THE COURT: Pause. MR. WILLIAMS: Sure. THE COURT: I didn't follow that. I thought that Wilmington Trust was getting 100,000 bucks per month for its services. MR. WILLIAMS: It currently is, Your Honor, that's correct. It currently is. Wilmington Trust gets \$100,000 per month for its services as GUC Trust administrator and Avoidance Action Trust administrator. THE COURT: Now does the trust documentation say that notwithstanding that \$100,000 fee that the compensation to Wilmington Trust must be reasonable? MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Your Honor, the trust agreement itself doesn't make reference to the \$100,000 fee at all, the \$100,000 fee was based upon Wilmington Trust's initial proposal to the Department of Treasury and therefore it was included in a line item in the budget. The GUC Trust agreement itself and the Avoidance Action Trust agreement

And so when my client, the -- Wilmington Trust

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itself just say reasonable compensation, that's it.

came to me and said, look, I'm getting -- I'm spending a lot more time than we initially anticipated on this case, this \$100,000, although it's substantial, is not what we -- is not covering the amount of work that we're doing what are my rights? I said, look, you're entitled to reasonable compensation, but I think -- and again, the document is silent on this point -- but I said, look, as a practical matter given the fact that we're making this motion let's let all creditors know what you're proposed -- Your Honor, I would just reference section 9.7 of the GUC Trust agreement, and it says:

"Compensation and expenses. The GUC Trust administrator shall receive fair and reasonable compensation for its services to be paid out of the wind down budget cash in accordance with the budget prior to the final distribution date.

The GUC Trust administrator shall be entitled without the need for approval of the Bankrupt Court to reimburse itself from wind down budget cash on a monthly basis."

And then I go to the next sentence:

"In addition, to the extent the wind down budget cash is not sufficient to provide the GUC Trust administrator fair and reasonable compensation for its services or for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses it

shall be paid out of other GUC Trust administrative cash."

THE COURT: Now to what extent is the \$100,000 embodied in a contract or other piece of paper?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the only piece of paper that it was embodied in -- well, it's really two. There was an initial proposal that went to the Department of United States Treasury, and then it subsequently wound up in the line item of the budget itself, but that's really it.

There's not a separate contract --

THE COURT: Proposal walks and talks a little bit like an offer. Was there any acceptance?

MR. WILLIAMS: I think it's fair to say that there was acceptance by treasury and that everybody assumed that this was going to be -- that the \$100,000 per month was going to be enough. But the proposal itself provided that, you know, that even in the proposal that to the extent that we reserve the right to revisit the fee -- that Wilmington Trust reserves the right to revisit the fee.

And the truth of the matter, Judge, is that
Wilmington Trust is doing substantially more work than it
was originally contemplated in this engagement, and because
of that we think -- which is why -- you know, we noticed
this out to every creditor, right, I said, look, there's not
really a -- there's not really a provision in the GUC Trust

agreement that says, you know, how do you get -- how do you determine what's fair and reasonable for your compensation? You certainly can't agree with yourself, right, so I said, here -- the best way to do it, we're doing this motion to sell stock, let's notice up, because every creditor is going to get notice of this, this notice up every creditor, let's try to describe in some meaningful detail, you know, what your hours are and what you're doing and we'll let people -and we'll let the creditors decide if this is reasonable or not. That was the best thing that we could come up with. And to date three creditors objected and now it's down to two, and we've got to Nova Scotia trustee -- I'm sorry -the Nova Scotia trustee has withdrawn its objection, we have certain of the Nova Scotia bondholders that have objected, and I'm not sure if the State of New York -- they filed an objection, I'm not sure if they objected to this particular component of the relief or not, but those are the two parties that objected.

We submit that based upon the time and energy being utilized by Wilmington Trust in this engagement that the proposal -- the up size in the fee is reasonable based upon the up size in the work that they're doing.

I would also note that, right, in connection with the reporting and transfer costs, which I don't think any party has objected to, Wilmington Trust is doing substantial

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work -- substantial work.

Nobody, you know, when this plan went effective back in -- when was it March or -- of 010 -- nobody envisioned -- right, well, the thought was that we were going to have sign off from the SEC on no action relief and we were going to be -- you know, we were going to be able to implement the plan on the transferability of the units. The SEC has come back and asked for numerous, numerous additional controls. They've asked in essence for full Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, we're going to be filing 10-K's, 10-Q's, Wilmington Trust is taking on substantial additional liability risk and for that reason, you know, again we think it's appropriate that they be compensated for that.

And again, I don't think that any of the parties here have objected to that relief, but it's just another showing that the document itself never required that Wilmington Trust will be limited to \$100,000 per month on its flat fee.

I -- Your Honor had a question about Jay Alix Services, it was a little bit unclear to me what you were asking.

THE COURT: Well, I thought what Jay Alix was doing was fly specking the claims and providing assistance on claims objections.

MR. WILLIAMS: They are doing that, Your Honor,

but they're doing other things.

Again, for instance, with the reporting and transfer costs they've been helping the GUC Trust build -- assist us in building up the controls and the like, so Alix is doing substantial other work as well.

But the answer is, Alix is doing a lot of work in the claims reconciliation procedure -- the claims reconciliation process and we think that --

THE COURT: Well, but the premise underlying my question, and you can tell me whether you think that premise was well taken or not, was that there is at least seemingly a greater direct benefit in analyzing claims and trying to knock them down than some of the other things that you're trying to sell stock for.

MR. WILLIAMS: Look, claims reconciliation is a huge component of what we're trying to do, I certainly agree with that, but I don't think -- look, I mean if you were to ask the creditors' committee, you know, reporting and transfer, right, that was -- and again no one has objected to that, I think creditors have said that, you know, we're in favor of that. I think that that's very important.

Certain of these other things, you know, while they're not necessarily fun to talk about, like insurance or you know the insurance deductible or you know tax analysis, we're required to do that. Wilmington Trust is required to

do that.

And so, you know, from Wilmington Trust's

perspective and from a liability perspective I would say

that they're all important, certainly with respect to making

the distributions to creditor, which, you know, originally

one of the reasons we're over budget with respect to

distributions itself was as it's initially been

contemplated, and which we're hopefully going get there at

some point soon, all distributions would be pushed out

directly through DTC because we would have these

transferable units and every unit would actually be in DTC

land and we could sort of push it all out, but we're not

there yet. And because of that, right, the budget initially

contemplated that we'd be able to pass on most of these

costs to the SEC.

The answer is we hasn't been able to do that.

We've been spending, you know, time -- we and Gibson Dunn,
some of my associates and we've been able to push off the
work now, but you know, assisting creditors, you know,
talking to them about getting their distributions, what
forms you have to fill out, how you have to contact your
brokers and the like, this all takes real time, and I don't
think we can just say, you know, knocking out claims is the
only thing that is important here. I think that it's all
important and it's -- a lot of it to be frank just wasn't

Page 90 1 anticipated and that's why we're here, Your Honor. And the 2 GUC Trust administrator in its fiduciary capacity has 3 determined that this motion makes sense, it doesn't make 4 this motion lightly. 5 We -- as I said earlier, we had been pushing very 6 hard to -- we were hoping we would never be in this 7 situation, Your Honor, I think that's fair to say, but unfortunately we are, but we do think that this is going to 8 9 be the best way to maximize value for creditors, and for 10 that we would ask that your court -- that Your Honor grant 11 the motion. 12 I'm happy to answer any other questions, 13 Your Honor has. THE COURT: No, you took care of them once we went 14 15 along, Mr. Williams. Thank you. 16 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Who wants to be heard next? 18 Mr. Dublin? MR. DUBLIN: Phil Dublin, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer 19 20 & Feld truck on behalf of Green Hunt Wedlake. 21 Your Honor, Mr. Williams is correct that our objection has been resolved. We've had numerous --22 23 THE COURT: It is correct? 24 MR. DUBLIN: He is correct, yes. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DUBLIN: That our objection has been resolved.

We had numerous conversations after the filing of our objection to get more information, which they then incorporated into the reply. They gave us some of that information in advance that we'd be able continue to due diligence leading up to the hopeful resolution.

I think it boils down to the fact of poor budgeting for the most part as to what happened here. People did not foresee what the aggregate costs were going to be for the trust and we know that there is work for that trust that needs to be done, work for the trust to do, and we believe that through modifying the reporting now with the 6.2 reports as Mr. Williams referenced, that now the creditor body will have an opportunity to see on a quarterly basis the types of costs that are being incurred by the professionals and for the different types of services, and with that greater clarity we wouldn't be in a situation of surprise when a year goes by and you see the amounts that have been incurred and amounts that are projected there would be better controls for the world to understand what's happening in connection with this trust.

And hopefully as Mr. Williams mentioned this is more than sufficient enough value to take care of everything the trust needs to do, and if they have to come back asking for more later then we have our rights to challenge that as

well.

At that since we've resolved our objections I'm not going to go through each of your points unless there's anything specific you have for me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Who's next? Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor, David Jones for the U.S. Attorney's Office, and specifically actually I'm here today in my capacity as counsel for the U.S.'s unsecured creditor and specifically EPA.

I'll very briefly say that a lot of things were said about treasury department and its role in the budgeting process and in negotiations, and I simply am not in a position to comment knowledgeably or at least in depth on that. I do know that treasury at the time of confirmation accurately negotiated what it believed to be appropriate budgets going forward and what professionals agreed would be appropriate budgets going forward with an eye to meeting treasury's obligations to fund the wind down, yet at the same time not do so in a manner that would waste public resources unnecessarily.

So my understanding is the design of the plan and the relevant trusts is that they're to live within funding provided by treasury for that purpose, and to the extent that's not sufficient they need to eat into other sources of

funding, and the purpose of that structure is to encourage efficient discharge of the various responsibilities.

THE COURT: You're saying in substance that what they spend so long as it's not part of the treasury budget is their problem, but you're not taking the position on whether that's good or bad.

MR. JONES: Right. And Your Honor, I should say,
I am -- and I hesitate to have -- I want to make clear the
limits of my knowledge. I am going on my memory of events
at the time of confirmation and my understanding of how that
went, so I don't want to misspeak, but I, at the same time
having heard a lot of things said about treasury, want to
just put out that my, you know, imprecise and unrefreshed
understanding is essentially that treasury wanted to impose
cost discipline on this case going forward, that it was
going to fund prospectively the remainder of the wind down
but only up to justified levels that it committed to do
that, it provided funding up to that level, and yes, that it
did not want that to be a lax process or one without teeth.
I'm not --

THE COURT: What you've just told me was the treasury perspective, now switch to the EPA perspective.

MR. JONES: Correct. And Your Honor, I want to be clear that for neither treasury nor for EPA nor any other governmental component are we taking any position on this

motion.

EPA of course is a very major unsecured creditor of the estate and so has a very substantial interest simply in appropriate cost controls and preservation of the corpus of assets that will ultimately be paid out to unsecured creditors in the estate.

Every single unsecured creditor in this case has its own unique and very great significance they attach to the payout in the case of EPA, critical public purposes are achieved through these payouts in the form of environmental remediation.

We did request from counsel for Wilmington Trust clarifications and additional information of the nature that they've discussed here today and that they also provided another party, and they did provide some clarifications and also an indication that they would be scaling back the scope of their request at the present time, and in part based on those discussions and based specifically on their assurance that the request sought would not cause any, as Your Honor said, discrimination issue, there will be not be a disparate payout rate for any creditors they assure us as a result of this motion we determined simply to take no position.

We have not undertaken a fly specking of their budgets and their cash burn rates and everything else that's being -- that gives rise to the situation that's before the

Court today, so we're -- I mean, I'll say it again, so we are neither affirmatively consenting nor affirmatively objecting.

We do want to note that any incursions into the corpus, into the assets available for unsecured creditors is of very great concern to the government as unsecured creditor and I know it is as to the entire creditor body, and for that reason we want to express and put on the record our hope that there will be no further asset sales required or sought in the future, that the professionals will redouble their efforts to live within the budget as set forth, and that this case can proceed as efficiently and cost effectively as possible.

That's really the full extent of what I have to say, Your Honor, and if the Court has no questions --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: -- then I'll sit. Thank you.

THE COURT: Others? Mr. Zirinsky and Ms. Leary.

MS. LEARY: Your Honor, good morning, Maureen
Leary for the State of New York and New York Attorney
General's Office.

New York was actually heartened to see in the reply a lot of the information that was provided in the three affidavits.

There are a couple of small points I'd like to

Page 96 1 make. 2 We were pleased that the no action funding and the 3 future tax liability funding requests were withdrawn. I 4 don't necessarily believe that the trust concurred that 5 those matters were not ripe as we asserted, but it's 6 academic. I still believe that there are some matters here 7 that may still not be ripe, and Your Honor referred to the 8 2012/2014 budget. 9 THE COURT: You said 2020 -- 2012 to 2014, 10 Ms. Leary, but if I heard it right they're only looking for 11 2011 and 2012 at this point. 12 MS. LEARY: I think that's right, but I think the 13 reserve is still being requested; is that correct? So the 14 money would be available for liquidation any way? 15 THE COURT: Do you mind yielding to him to answer 16 your question, Ms. Leary? 17 MS. LEARY: Not at all. 18 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm just not sure I understand the 19 question. 20 The reserve being the -- we've -- Your Honor, as I 21 stated earlier, we've reserved stock for 2013 and 2014, 22 we're not seeking to sell that at this time, the initial motion didn't seek to --23 24 THE COURT: So if the stock isn't being sold can I properly assume -- both parties, first you, Mr. Williams and 25

Ms. Leary -- that that aspect is no harm no foul at this juncture?

MR. WILLIAMS: I believe so, Your Honor, yes. And again, for the reasons I stated earlier we don't know if it's going to be adequate or unnecessary based upon our initial budgeting, we think we're going to need it, but given 2013 is so far away and given all the uncertainties we've seen in this case to date we're not seeking to sell it at this time.

THE COURT: Well, if you're not seeking to sell it that's obviously helpful, but is the purpose of -- what then is the purpose of reserving it? So you don't have to come back to me?

MR. WILLIAMS: No, we would still have to come back to you, Your Honor. The way the GUC Trust agreement works is that we're entitled to reserve it to the extent that we think we're going to be over. We don't have to sell it yet.

The issue is that if we don't reserve it now the GUC Trust has a very set formula, and if it's not set aside in the reserve it gets pushed out to unsecured creditors on a quarterly basis.

And so the concern is that if we push out that stock that we think we're going to need for 2013 and 2014 we're not going to have it to sell at that point. So right

Page 98 1 now we've just put it in a lock box. 2 THE COURT: Forgive me, I think you've said this, 3 but it's important. 4 MR. WILLIAMS: Sure. 5 THE COURT: So under the reserve concept the stock 6 wouldn't be sold, but it wouldn't be considered to be -- the 7 value of the reserve would not be considered available for distribution in the next wave to the unsecured creditor 8 9 community. 10 MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. Back to Ms. Leary, please. 12 MS. LEARY: And so the reserve concept, I want to direct the Court to Ms. Phillips' affidavit, and I believe 13 it's paragraph 13 in which she states, "It is clear that 14 15 there will be substantial overruns based on future 16 projections." 17 So the reserve, whether it's liquidated or not, it's still not going to be available to the creditors, so we 18 still have concern about that. 19 20 And just to sort of make a finer point here, I 21 believe in the claims resolution process once claims are 22 disallowed that amount of stock is then freed up and available to the GUC Trust if it chooses to come back to the 23 24 Court and see a reservation. 25 So I don't really think that this money going out

as a reserve is going to result in them not having any available assets. But let me -- let me just broaden this.

THE COURT: You mean to distribute to the unsecured creditor community who's got all fully allowed claims?

MS. LEARY: That's correct.

So there's a question in my mind about whether there is still ripeness on that future projected substantial as referred to by Ms. Phillips, overruns, that are anticipated. Because as far as I'm concerned that money is reserved and liquidated whether they have to come back to the Court or not, there's not going to be much anybody in my view will be able to say about it. Maybe they will, but I certainly don't want to come back.

As Mr. Jones eluded to, my purpose is to assure that all creditors are treated equally within not just this small box of pro rata sharing in the reserves that Your Honor ordered -- and I'm speaking about a different reserve now -- you entered an order that set reserves for each of the allowed -- the disputed not allowed claims before confirmation.

And what is troubling in -- and it may be my own misunderstanding or some semantical issue -- what's troubling in the GUC Trust motion is their reference to -- in response to New York's concern about discrimination --

which I understand Your Honor doesn't see -- but their statement is that all creditors share pro rata in the reserve, and I view that as different than sharing pro rata in the entire corpus of the trust. Maybe there's no difference, but what I expected in response to our objection on discrimination isn't a statement that it won't result in undue harm, I expected a statement consistent with the GUC Trust that this liquidation of assets and future liquidations will not unfairly discriminate against any creditor whether it's Wilmington Trust down to the smallest of creditors. That's the statement that's missing from the papers.

Even though I feel that the reply gave a lot of information, there's still this one piece that perhaps

Mr. Williams can clarify, and maybe I'm reading too much into the difference between sharing and pro rata in this reserve, which I view as differently than the corpus of the trust.

THE COURT: I'll tell you now, Ms. Leary, I'm going need help either from you or Mr. Williams in understanding that issue. Because I thought that for those who have heretofore unallowed claims, claims that were disputed but not ruled on, you're fully reserved, and I'm not clear on whether you're trying to protect your interest in the subset of your claims that's in this category or the

subset of your claims that have been fully allowed, because it's my impression you've got claims in each category.

MS. LEARY: That's right. And I would suggest,

Your Honor, that we're trying to protect both. We're trying
to protect both our position as an allowed claimant and our
position as still holding unresolved claims.

THE COURT: And in your disallowed category -- or not disallowed because they haven't been disallowed -- you're not yet allowed category --

MS. LEARY: Correct.

THE COURT: -- or your unallowed category -- maybe they'll be allowed and maybe they won't -- I -- it's my understanding subject to your rights to convince me otherwise that you're fully reserved and protected on that and that your contention, if any, is as the -- one of the relatively few in the unsecured creditor community who thinks that there's an inequality issue there because I'm having more trouble seeing that.

MS. LEARY: Well, you know, in all honesty, I
don't -- I can't tell. I cannot tell whether at the end of
the day Wilmington Trust, who got the initial distribution,
is going to have been treated differently than New York
State or any other creditor that is allowed later.

THE COURT: You got your piece of the action on the initial distributions --

Page 102 1 MS. LEARY: No. 2 THE COURT: -- up to this point. MS. LEARY: 3 No. 4 THE COURT: On your allowed claims? 5 MS. LEARY: No. We were -- we were not given a distribution until a month ago and that was the first 6 7 distribution we received, I believe it was the 3rd. We 8 had --9 THE COURT: Is that because of a delay in getting 10 your claims allowed or because they were mean to you back 11 when you had allowed claims and didn't get distributions on 12 the original effective date? 13 MS. LEARY: I'm going to have to plead the Fifth on that, but as I think I set forth in either these papers 14 15 or the ones on the motion you're going to consider on 16 March 1st, New York had a deal on its -- on those claims 17 that have since been allowed in March, and it was before confirmation I believe. 18 THE COURT: March of 2012? 19 20 MS. LEARY: '11. 21 THE COURT: '11. MS. LEARY: Yes. In March 2011. And it did not 22 -- we did not receive a distribution until January of 2012. 23 We had a stipulation I believe in June, that took -- I mean 24 25 there was in my view some -- I chalked it up to up and

running kind of trying to figure things out, the GUC was -GUC Trust was mixed up with many, many different issues and
so forth, but I don't know why it took that long. I know
that I had some correspondence with the GUC Trust in which I
emailed and telephoned, and I'm not getting a whole lot of
feedback frankly, but you know, those issues are not before
the Court. We did not participate in the initial
distribution that Wilmington Trust got, the 150 million
shares I believe it was.

So at the end of the day I don't know. I -- and that's why I'm here, I don't know. And each time there is an erosion of the corpus of the trust through liquidation and payment of professionals that reduces the recovery that New York will receive in either position that it holds I believe, because it -- New York believes it shares in the entire corpus equitably with the other creditors, and I believe that's what the GUC Trust says, that's what Your Honor said in confirming this plan. But the question really is at the end of the day is that actually what happened?

So my expectation in these rely papers was that Mr. Williams -- the GUC Trust would come back and say not, you won't be unduly harmed, they would come back and say, no, we have this issue addressed. You will not be discriminated, you will be treated the same whether you're

Page 104 1 allowed on day one, as Wilmington Trust was as the initial 2 recipient of the initial distribution, as on day whatever 3 the end date is. THE COURT: However I had understood when I issued 4 5 my ruling that day one is the day that your claim is allowed 6 or the effective date of the plan, whichever comes later --7 MS. LEARY: That's right. THE COURT: -- but day one -- if there was a delay 8 9 in your claim being allowed --10 MS. LEARY: I still get treated the same as day 11 one. 12 THE COURT: -- but that it would be measured by the time -- well, day one was the date your claim was 13 14 allowed even though that's after the effective date. 15 MS. LEARY: I may have misunderstood you, 16 Your Honor, but are you saying that under your order New 17 York gets treated or any creditor gets treated the same no 18 matter when their claim is allowed? Because I believe that's expressed in your order. Regardless of when my claim 19 20 becomes --21 THE COURT: You get X shares of stock then without 22 a true up on account of market movements. 23 MS. LEARY: That's correct, we do not get the true 24 up on account of whether the stock is trading on the day I

get distribution at 19 or 35.

THE COURT: So unless they pocket vetoed you on distributions after your claim would be allowed I don't see a prejudice to you.

MS. LEARY: Well, Your Honor, I hope -- I hope so.

I did have an expectation that the GUC Trust would come back
and make that statement, not the statement of undue harm,
which implies some harm, it's just not undue.

You know, I also want to address a couple of other issues primarily on the professional fees.

You know, I think the Vinasky, Phillips, and
Marrow (ph) affidavit were certainly -- went further in
providing information to creditors about how everything
works behind this black curtain, and as set forth in our
objection, our limited objection, there's no question that
professionals have to be paid. The administrator has to be
paid. The monitor should be paid. No question in our mind.

The only question is, is what are the controls?

And the thing missing from these papers is the criteria that is applied in terms of determining reasonableness. Love the layers.

What's the criteria? Are they applying this

Court's rulings, the law of this case that you spent -- not

hours -- weeks, months with the fee examiner talking about?

Is it inconsistent -- is it consistent or inconsistent with

U.S. Trustee's guidelines? What is the story on the

criteria being applied?

THE COURT: Well, I'm not aware that the U.S.

Trustee guidelines either present or proposed have any
relation to this issue.

MS. LEARY: Well, I think there has to be some criteria, and that criteria has to be disclosed to the creditors who are the beneficiaries.

And the important thing that I believe is worth noting is the GUC Trust views this 10 percent hold back as some time of a penalty. That money gets paid. It may be a hold back, but it's not available to the creditors.

So there's no incentive here to stay within budget. All there's an incentive to do is say, well, can we live with that 10 percent until the end of the case? We're going to get paid, but -- so that's no penalty in my view.

And I think it would be easy for this Court to impose some criteria to ask the GUC Trust to disclose to -- this is the criteria on which we will judge reasonableness.

And I think this Court has spoken as has the fee examiner in this case or numerous occasions about that issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Now you hit on one of the things I was about to ask you about, Ms. Leary.

After they gave you the clarifying information and the three new affidavits what issues do I have left from your perspective other than the need to announce the

Page 107 1 criteria for payment? MS. LEARY: Well, I think -- I think that the 2 3 Court should look again at this question of ripeness of the 2012/2014 budget, and I think Ms. Phillips is the -- you 4 5 know, probably the best source of why that -- the Court 6 should look at that more closely in terms of her statement 7 that there will be future projected overruns and they will 8 be substantial. 9 And other than that, Your Honor, I hope that -- my hope for all the creditors in the pool is that there be 10 11 greater transparency, and I think that that is going to be 12 helped by the settlement that was reached to one of the 13 objections that requires a little bit additional disclosure 14 under 6.2. 15 Other than that, Your Honor, if you don't have any 16 other questions I -- I have nothing further. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. LEARY: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Zirinsky? 19 20 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 (Pause) 22 MR. ZIRINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try 23 to be brief. I think like Your Honor our reaction when we saw 24 25 -- our client's reaction when we saw the initial motion was

people were basically astounded at the dramatic increase in the projected budget for 2012. This was a budget that was put together and submitted and represented to the Court and to the creditors through the disclosure statement only nine months earlier before the end of March 2011.

And so the initial question was, well, how could they have underestimated by such a large amount? Basically for 2012 it's almost a 70 percent increase from what their budget was -- their original budget was and what they're now asking for.

And we understand that the people who were involved in preparing that initial budget had to negotiate with the U.S. Treasury, the DIP lender, other parties, but they were also the parties who were in the best position to know what the cost would likely be.

You have the former chairperson of the creditors' committee who is now Wilmington Trust as the GUC and the Avoidance Action Trustee, and FTI, which is the monitor for both of those trusts. My understanding was they were the financial advisor or one of the financial advisors for the creditors' committee.

So these people didn't come in as babes in the wood not understanding the terrain and what the future tasks were likely to be.

Having said that we're not suggesting that they be

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starved and that they shouldn't get a penny more, that's not our issue. Moreover, we are pleased that in the reply we did get a lot more information than we had in the original motion, which at least explains where the areas with more specificity where the areas of increase were likely to be.

What we don't really have is an explanation as to how they arrive at these numbers and whether they're reasonable in terms of the -- basically the potential benefits to the creditors through the expenditure of these additional monies.

But that's really a transparency issue, and I
think that what we're really concerned about is not so much
that there's a prospect of higher costs, but how are we
going to control those costs going forward?

And there's been a lot said by the trustee in its papers regarding this very precise process or strict process of budgeting and living up to budgets, and the U.S.

Treasury, the DIP lender examining all of the expenses before they're paid. But I think what's also clear is that U.S. Treasury is concerned about its money not being spent beyond what it's approved in its budget.

I don't think it's reasonable to expect the U.S.

Treasury once the amounts being requested are in excess of
the budget that they're going to pay and now it's going to
come out of the creditors' money to fund the excess. It's

not fair to say that the people who are spending the money and the people who are receiving the increased -- the benefit of these increases are the sole judges or should be the sole judges of what's reasonable.

Put another way, the people who really have a financial stake in the GUC Trust and the other trust potentially are not represented in any fashion in terms of the budgeting process. We get information after the fact.

And what I would suggest, and I don't have a proposal for Your Honor, but what I would suggest is that there needs to be an independent party. I mean I understand the skepticism that we're an adversary right now on our disputed claim so it certainly shouldn't be us, and we're not proposing that it be us, but there should be somebody who the Court is comfortable with who has an ability not just to complain after the fact, after the money has been spent and they come back next year and say, well, you know, last year the budget was this and now we've anticipated we're going to have another 50 percent increase in expenses because of all of these unforeseen things. We need somebody who's there and can see the money being spent or how the decisions are made.

THE COURT: Who'll work for free, Mr. Zirinsky?

Because I could swear that one of the entities that is on

the list of the people who the unsecureds are paying for --

MR. ZIRINSKY: Is the monitor.

THE COURT: -- is the fee examiner's own law firm.

Isn't that part of my problem that every time I put somebody

new in the process I've got --

MR. ZIRINSKY: It's another expense layer.

THE COURT: -- Wilmington Trust, FTI, they're not only not working for free but they're contributing to the overruns that I'm dealing with?

MR. ZIRINSKY: That's the dilemma. And what I'm

-- I mean I'd happy to hear about the partial -- what I

consider to be a partial resolution as we'll get more

information on a quarterly basis, that's good, okay, I'm

happy with that, but the question is what's the control

mechanism to make sure that what -- that if the money is not

-- how do we assure that the money is being well spent?

It's in the budget, yes, we'll be able to track and see

whether or not they've spent more than they were supposed to

spend, but how do we determine whether or not at the end of

the day the money has been well spent?

And secondly, how do we determine or get comfortable that the same people who gave us a projection that's off by 70 percent nine months later for 2012, how do we have confidence that they're projection for 2012 and potentially years beyond 2012, how do we have confidence that those are good projections?

I understand their projections and there are no guarantees on projections, but I think anyone in this room would concede that a 70 percent variance in nine months from a budget estimate is extraordinary.

And we're not here to, you know, fall on our swords over this, we're not here because we're -- you know, we -- you know, we don't like them because they're litigating with us over their claims, we're here because at the end of the day we have confidence that we are going to have allowed claims, and we, like every other creditor, has an interest in making sure that whatever money needs to be spent to maximize creditor recoveries is being spent wisely, and it's as simple as that.

And we haven't had an opportunity to meet with the trustee or its counsel. We were not in part of the dialogue. There may be, and I don't think that the Court wants to take the rest of the day dealing with this, but I think there may be an opportunity or benefit if we could have a recess or an adjournment of this so we can have an opportunity to talk to Gibson Dunn and their clients and see if there's an ability to come up with some mechanism that's not going to add another substantial layer of cost, but some additional mechanism that will give creditors comfort that money -- the money spending decisions are being done wisely and that the costs are reasonable.

I mean one example, Your Honor, is the 13 some million dollars that's being proposed to be put from these proceeds into the Avoidance Action Trust. There's a dispute -- it's on appeal now I understand -- but there's a dispute as to who's the beneficiary of any recovery under that action.

So the papers filed -- I mean reply filed by
Wilmington Trust says, well, you know, the potential
recovery is a billion and a half dollars, and what's 13 and
a half million dollars, it's a very small minuscule
percentage of that. Well that's one way to look at it, but
it's also 13 and a half million dollars of money coming
that's being funded by the unsecured creditors.

We have no idea what happens if the appeal -- if it turns out that the unsecured creditors are not entitled to the benefits of that avoidance action. We have no basis -- understanding one way or another as to what the potential likelihood of success is on that litigation.

We're not looking for trade secrets, we're not looking to invade confidential information, but we don't have any sense at all as to if the recovery is going to be made ultimately for the benefit of the DIP lenders then it should be the DIP lenders what are potentially funding that litigation. If there is a recovery that's going to be made as Your Honor noted earlier in the hearing, there's a

potential billion and a half dollars of additional unsecured claims, so we could have the terrible result where they actually win the litigation on that avoidance action, they create an unsecured claim for a billion and a half dollars, they recover assets, and the benefit of that recovery doesn't go to the unsecured creditors, and the unsecured creditors paid for all of that.

THE COURT: Would your argument be the same or different if I told you that I thought that under -- in the spectrum of issues that I decide, some I think are close and some aren't that close, and I'm really pretty damn sure that I got it right on that last one.

(Laughter)

MR. ZIRINSKY: I have no doubt.

THE COURT: I'm sure Mr. Jones ain't going like that, but I mean that's what his rights are in the appellate system.

MR. ZIRINSKY: Well, that may be the answer, but you know, until you just said that I don't know. I mean I obviously haven't read every paper or attended every hearing in this case.

THE COURT: Unfortunately on the underlying issue my opinion no longer matters because I issued a judgment.

MR. ZIRINSKY: I understand that.

THE COURT: But I'm now asked to make

discretionary calls based upon my estimate of the probability of a reversal, and I think that if I'm allowed to exercise my discretion I don't weigh the probability of a reversal very highly.

MR. ZIRINSKY: And that's all to the good, Your Honor.

My only point is that there needs to be some dialogue in terms of explaining that to people, because I frankly did not glean that from the papers and their request for take 13 and a half million dollars and put it in another trust without having any knowledge as to what evaluation the trust has made in terms of the cost benefit analysis other than to say it's only a small percentage -- very minuscule percentage of the potential recovery. I agree with that, but it's also 13 and a half million dollars which is a lot of money.

So having said that, Your Honor, I don't want to take up more of your time. I do think that it would be helpful to have some additional dialogue to see if there's some reasonable way to impose some discipline -- I have the complete confidence in the U.S. Treasury to watch its money on the portion of the budget that it's going to be -- that it's funding, okay? I have less confidence in them -- I love my country and I love my government -- but I have less confidence in them to be as careful when it's no longer

their money being spent but it's the unsecured creditor's money being spend.

I don't think to be fair at the time of the confirmation of the plan, I think the message we heard was that we have this mechanism to sell securities as a safety valve, that in the event the trust ran into a problem and there was a short fall there'd be an ability to access some of the money subject to Court approval. What I don't think was -- and I agree with that.

What I don't think was contemplated was that this was part of the deal and that therefore in terms of evaluating how they're going to pay their expenses going forward they could assume that they had access to the reserve securities in order to fund whatever additional expenses they thought might be reasonable in the future.

I think it -- there's a real difference in that in terms of -- and I think Your Honor eluded to that in your opening comments on this matter -- that I sat in the confirmation hearing, I heard the same thing Your Honor heard. I heard that there was going to be strict adherence to a budget, and said fine, we didn't object by the way, we didn't object to that -- to that issue at all. We objected to others and Your Honor dealt with them. But we were satisfied with that. But it was not our understanding that what was viewed as a safety valve was going to be viewed as

an open faucet for more money just to come in whenever they had a need for it and a desire to spend it.

So I do think that it's good to have -- it's good to have some mechanism where the unsecured creditors who are the potential beneficiaries of all of this and are also going to be funding the bill for these excess costs have some person other than parties who are recipients of these monies and these expenditures to be able to be comfortable that the money is being wisely spent.

Thank you.

brief.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Mr. Williams, I'll take reply.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor, I'll be

With respect to the question that New York State had about the reserve, this is not coming out of the reserve. We don't view this as -- you know, I mentioned to Ms. Leary that I would make the statement that from our perspective, you know, this is -- the stock that's being sold was defined as excess GUC Trust distributable assets. A lot of definitions in this trust agreement. But the excess GUC Trust distributable assets had we not sold them they would have been distributed out to unsecured creditors.

The reserve is what it is, and at the time when the claim is allowed they'll be entitled to the same pro

rata distribution that allowed claim holders get.

I would note that Ms. -- the State of New York's claim when it was allowed it was paid in the next quarterly distribution. There were apparently some hold ups with the allowance of the claim. It wasn't a distribution mechanic, right, the GUC Trust makes quarterly distributions, and she was -- and New York State got its distribution in the next quarterly distribution. There wasn't any issue with the trust. The trust has been pushing out distributions very efficiently, Your Honor.

With respect to the -- there were some references to the Anna Phillips declaration about substantial overruns and how it's a real issue. We agree it's a real issue, which is why we're making this motion. The substantial overruns that she references are overruns for 2012.

And as Your Honor mentioned earlier, the vast majority of this is for claims reconciliation. If you look at the 2012 budget or the revised budget the vast majority of it for claims reconciliation. And thee truth is, there are still a lot of claims to do. The initial budget had contemplated that by now we'd be through all of the -- or through a lot of the claims, and the truth is we still have a lot more claims to do. And as I said earlier to the extent Your Honor wants an update on the claims reconciliation process we can give you one.

With respect to this issue about, you know, another layer of some sort of professional monitor on top of the monitor, I've got real concerns about that for a couple of reasons.

One is, you know, we filed this motion -- this filed was filed 35 days ago, right, so you know, the idea that we're going to work out some sort of a new mechanism where we're going to have a monitor or a trustee or something to sit on top of the monitor to review the monitor's fees who reviews the professional's fees, it's -- and who's going to monitor that monitor's fee? At some point we have to stop this.

And the truth is there is somebody reviewing the fees here, right, in addition to treasury, and it's both Ms. Phillips' firm, FTI, and Wilmington Trust, they review it for reasonableness. That's part of their job and they've been doing that.

And you know, right, the idea that we need some sort of standard to do that, you know, Mr. Vinasky -- you know, Wilmington Trust hires professionals all the time, they know better than anybody, probably better than a lot of the lawyers what a good fee statement looks like and what's getting done and what's not.

So I don't think we want to hire yet another professional and then at some point if someone is unhappy

with their fees that we're going to have to hire a professional to oversee that professional. Doesn't make a lot of sense to me, and I think that we've already got enough oversight here.

And at the end of the day even if there isn't -as I said earlier, Judge, this has been noticed up to all creditors, so every creditor has an opportunity to look at this motion and figure out, you know what, you know, based upon this and the benefit that I'm getting and the distributions that I've been getting from the trust on a quarter basis -- we've made a distribution I think on every quarter except for one so far -- and the reason we didn't make a distribution for the one quarter is because we didn't have enough excess GUC Trust distributable assets, there's a minimum threshold so we didn't make a distribution that quarter. I think that the creditors think that the GUC Trust is doing a pretty good job here and I don't think that we need -- the mere fact that it turned out that the initial budget negotiated with treasury wasn't enough isn't -doesn't make it necessary to hire yet another professional because it's just going to be another layer of expense.

Unless Your Honor has any other questions I don't have anything else to say, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we're going to do.

It appears to me that the principal issues remaining after

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what we've heard today, and especially what we got in the way of the three clarifying affidavits, are ripeness going forward, and I forgot the exact words Mr. Zirinsky, but it was roughly how we control cost going forward, and matters of transparency.

I think his idea of there being a caucus amongst the movants and the remaining objectors had some merit, and I would need time to dictate a decision in any event.

So here's what I want to do. Mr. William, I want you and anybody who's giving you direction or guidance to put your noodles together with Mr. Zirinsky and Ms. Leary on the matter of future control of cost and transparency over the lunch break while I'm blocking out thoughts to dictate a decision. Hopefully if your discussions are productive they will make some of the issues that I would otherwise need to decide go away.

As a preview of my decision that would be coming out at the end I think that concerns for 2011 have largely been addressed -- maybe I should say at least largely addressed giving myself that much wiggle move -- save and except only for one area where I might need extra information unless you can give it to me right now, as to the extent to which I've got a request for 2011 compensation above the 100,000 a month, and maybe you can tell me now whether we're talking about something material or whether

it's de minimis in the context of the total request.

My main concern is getting a protocol for deciding if I have to have it litigated or having comfort that it's going to be resolved, how we're going to avoid problems going forward in 2012.

And you're to caucus with them maybe over soup or sandwiches to see if you can make some issues or recommendation to me that gives me something that people are comfortable with.

I don't want to play a venging angel here if there are no objections, but I do need to have comfort that the unsecured creditors are going to be as protected as well as the government is in 2012 and thereafter.

So my recommendation, it's 1 o'clock, is that we reconvene at 2:15, at which time or as quickly thereafter as I can I'll dictate something, but hopefully you'll give me a lesser number of areas upon which I have to dictate a litigated decision. Okay?

So we're in recess.

Oh, before we do, Mr. Williams, can you answer the question that I articulated in the remarks I just made? How much are we talking about that your client wants above 100,000 a month?

MR. WILLIAMS: For 2011 none.

THE COURT: For 2011 none at all?

Page 123 1 MR. WILLIAMS: None at all. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. WILLIAMS: For 2011 the issue was, you know, 4 011 ended and we said, you know, we're seeking it for 012 5 going forward, but for 011 none. 6 THE COURT: Okay, that's helpful. 7 All right, we're in recess. MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 (Recess at 1:00 p.m.) 10 THE CLERK: All rise. 11 THE COURT: Have seats, please. 12 Okay, before I rule are there any understandings 13 that you folks have to report to me? 14 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. 15 THE COURT: Come on over to the microphone, 16 please, Mr. Williams. 17 MR. WILLIAMS: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Matthew 18 William, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher for Wilmington Trust as the 19 GUC Trust administrator and GUC Trust monitor. 20 I'm happy to report to Your Honor that I think we 21 had very productive discussions during the lunch break. I 22 think we've reached a deal in principal with both the Nova 23 Scotia creditors as well as the State of New York, and I was 24 going to let Your Honor knows the terms of that arrangement 25 and answer any questions that Your Honor may have.

THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and do that and then I'll give Mr. Zirinsky and Ms. Leary a chance to comment.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.

As I mentioned earlier I just wanted to clarify again for the Court that with respect to the initial relief that we had sought on the \$17 million worth of stock the transfer to the Avoidance Action Trust to fund a potential tax issue we're no longer seeking that relief.

For the 2012 budget what the parties agreed to would be that it would in essence be a hard cap based upon what's in the current -- based upon a proposal that we made to the Court, and it would be I guess their budget attached to Exhibit B to the Vinasky declaration, which you know, has the line items, we'll file that with the 6.2 reports on a quarterly basis.

The hard cap for 2012, to the extent that the professionals go over the hard cap professionals are just going to have to share the pain. There's not going to be another request to the Court for 2012 to sell more stock to fund professional fees.

But that being said, the budget is not going to be line item constrained as it is currently with respect to the treasury budget. So to the extent there's an overage for one professional and an underage in another, you know, you

Page 125 can move around the line items, but there's going to be a hard cap, there's no more stock sales in 012, Your Honor. In connection with the -- in 2013 -- for the 2013 budget, we, the GUC Trust administrator, we're required to provide that to the DIP lenders in November of 2012. We'll be providing that to any other parties that, you know, ask for it, among others. We understand that the New York State as well as Mr. Zirinsky's clients have already asked for that so we'll be providing that to them at the same time we provide it to treasury. And finally, to the extent that we are going to make a motion, if we are in 2013 to sell anymore stock to fund expenses for 2013 we would meet and confer with the objecting parties before we made any such motion. THE COURT: The parties who have objected on this one?

MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Okay, Mr. Zirinsky, Ms. Leary, you want to be

heard?

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21 MR. ZIRINSKY: Your Honor, I think that Mr. Williams has accurately set forth the understandings we 22 23 reached over the lunch break.

You know, I just want to reiterate and I think this was very helpful for me to hear, and one of my clients

is here today, Morgan Stanley, was helpful for us to hear directly from Wilmington Trust and FTI some of the efforts that they have been making to try to control the expenses as well as the efforts that they have assured us they will continue to make and that will, you know, basically be, you know, a hard and fast budget, and if a professional is going over the budget too bad.

It's not going to be line item, but to the extent that the overall cap is being reached or breached it's not like the lawyers or the other professionals will stop working, they will be required to continue to work, but in some equitable fashion we'll leave it up to them, they're going to have to share the pain because there will not be any additional money and there won't be any money funding in 2013 to cover deficiencies in 2012.

This is a hard cap, full stop, and this is the budget they've asked for and they've agreed that they will live within the confines of this budget.

And with that, I mean we're not 100 percent happy, but we think that's a fair resolution.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

Ms. Leary?

MS. LEARY: Thank you, Your Honor.

One of the benefits of this discussion I want to be perfectly frank with you that -- was that we really did

get to see firsthand some of the things that both FTI and Wilmington are doing, and I have a greater level of confidence that I think the future will be better.

And I know this first year must have been very difficult for them, especially living with a budget that they themselves did not necessarily negotiate or plan for.

One of the things that I raised in the hearing this morning that I have a level of comfort on is the effort that will be undertaken in the future to really keep the professionals in a result-oriented mode and to evaluate the professional fees incurred when compared with the results achieved.

There's a lot to do in this case, I think
everybody in this room knows it, but I have confidence at
this point having discussed specifically with FTI what those
efforts are going to all be about in the future.

And no, we didn't get anything we wanted, we wouldn't have gotten it from you no doubt, but I think that this is a good result and I think it's a very good result for all the creditors.

Time will tell I think how the professionals may react and so forth, and I hope people in good faith move forward and this case doesn't last beyond 2014 at the latest.

THE COURT: My judicial term ends on

Page 128 1 September 5th, 2014. 2 MS. LEARY: That's a great deadline. So I hope it 3 happens. 4 MR. ZIRINSKY: That's a hard deadline, Judge. 5 MS. LEARY: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. Has everybody had a chance 7 to speak their piece? Evidently yes. 8 Mr. Williams, am I correct that you in 9 consultation with the others will be working up an order 10 that you can then represent to me that everybody is on board 11 on? 12 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, that would be our 13 intention. 14 THE COURT: Very good. Okay, make it happen. 15 Under these circumstances I see no need for me to 16 dictate anything that I was prepared to dictate, and I 17 assume that at this point nobody wants to know. MS. LEARY: I do. 18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's always nice to have a 19 20 peak. THE COURT: I'm going to exercise judicial 21 22 restraint. 23 (Laughter) 24 THE COURT: All right, very well, we're adjourned. (A chorus of thank you) 25

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3	I, Sherri L. Breach and Dawn South, certify that the		
4	foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the		
5	proceedings.		
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